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RECOGNIZING THE LIMITS OF ANTITRUST: THE
ROBERTS COURT VERSUS THE ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES
Thomas A. Lambert* & Alden F. Abbottt
ABSTRACT
In his seminal 1984 article, The Limits of Antitrust, Judge Frank Easterbrook pro-
posed that courts and enforcers adopt a simple set of screening rules for applica-
tion in antitrust cases, in order to minimize error and decision costs and thereby
maximize antitrust's social value. Over time, federal courts in general-and the
U.S. Supreme Court in particular, under Chief Justice Roberts have in substan-
tial part adopted Easterbrook's "limits of antitrust" approach, thereby helping
to reduce costly antitrust uncertainty. Recently, however, antitrust enforcers in
the Obama Administration (unlike their predecessors in the Reagan, Bush, and
Clinton Administrations) have been less attuned to this approach, and have
undertaken initiatives that reduce clarity and predictability in antitrust enforce-
ment. Regardless of the cause of the diverging stances on the limits of antitrust,
two things are clear. First, recent enforcement agency policies are severely at odds
with the philosophy that informs Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence. Second,
if the agencies do not reverse course, acknowledge antitrust's limits, and seek to
optimize the law in light of those limits, consumers will suffer.
JEL: L40; K21; 034; 038
I. INTRODUCTION
Three decades ago, then-professor Frank H. Easterbrook published a law
review article asserting the simple but profound point that antitrust law is
inherently limited in what it can accomplish and should be implemented
accordingly. Easterbrook's article, The Limits of Antitrust,1 set forth a general
prescription for maximizing antitrust's social value: in light of the inevitable
social losses from incorrect antitrust decisions ("error costs") and the costs of
assessing liability under the antitrust laws ("decision costs"), courts and regu-
lators should interpret and enforce antitrust's amorphous prohibitions so as to
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minimize the sum of error and decision costs. 2 Easterbrook then posited a
series of simple screening rules that, he argued, would maximize the net social
benefits created by antitrust regulation. 3
Without doubt, The Limits of Antitrust is one of the most influential antitrust
articles ever penned. Cited in more than 550 law journal articles,4 the piece
helped launch what some have called a "Neo-Chicago" approach to antitrust
analysis. Like its close cousin, the Chicago School of antitrust analysis, the
Neo-Chicago approach emphasizes the robustness of markets and is skeptical of
governmental efforts to correct for instances of market power. Neo-Chicagoans,
though, have backed off of some of the Chicago School's more extreme claims
that certain practices can never be anticompetitive. The Neo-Chicago approach
acknowledges that, under certain circumstances, anticompetitive harm may stem
from a number of business practices; yet, it emphasizes that potential anticompeti-
tive harm is only a necessary-never a sufficient-condition for antitrust interven-
tion.5 Following in Easterbrook's footsteps, Neo-Chicagoans urge consideration
of the tradeoffs associated with regulating versus not regulating. 6 They often con-
clude that the optimal policy is for antitrust to stay its hand even when the business
practice under consideration legitimately threatens some anticompetitive harm.
This article assesses the extent to which Easterbrook's "limits of antitrust"
perspective, which has been so influential among antitrust scholars, has been
adopted by the institutions holding the most sway over actual antitrust policy:
the federal courts and the antitrust enforcement agencies.7 The article
2 Id. at 16.
Id. at 17-39.
4 See WESTLAW (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.westlaw.com. A March 9, 2015 search of "Law
Reviews and Journals" within the Westlaw database revealed 552 articles citing The Limits of
Antitrust.
See generally Daniel Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, Neo-Chicago, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 1911, 1932-33
(2009) (describing a "Neo-Chicago" approach that would "rearticulat [e] [the Chicago School's]
second article of faith," by emphasizing that "competitive practices that cause harm cannot be
controlled without doing damage to similar competitive practices that do good" and that "the
good that would be chilled through aggressive antitrust enforcement is often greater than the bad
that would be prevented"); David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, Designing Antitrust Rules for Assessing
Unilateral Practices: A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 73, 75 (2005) (defining a "neo-
Chicago" approach that "accepts the Chicago tenet that legal rules" should be assessed "in terms
of efficiency," but also makes use of "post-Chicago insights in designing these rules").
6 Neo-Chicagoans reason that "market self-regulation is often superior to government regulation,
which frequently is a solution in search of a problem." See Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr. & Lee
Hoskins, The Case for Market-Based Regulation, 26 CATO J. 469 (2006). They recognize that the
costs of government failure may exceed those of market failure because, for example, regulators
face informational constraints (see F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. EcoN.
REv. 519 (1945)) and governmental officials' pursuit of their own self interest may reduce overall
social welfare (see, e.g., JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT
(1965)).
7 The Supreme Court has held that states may impose antitrust restrictions that are more
restrictive than those set forth in the federal antitrust laws. See Cal. v. ARC America Corp., 490
U.S. 93, 105 (1989). Many state restrictions are inconsistent with Easterbrook's limits of
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concludes that the federal judiciary-in particular, the U.S. Supreme Court
under Chief Justice John Roberts-has largely endorsed Easterbrook's limits
of antitrust approach. By contrast, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and
the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) have been far
less attuned to antitrust's limits. In the end, the enforcement agencies' failure
to respect those limits is likely to hit judicial roadblocks and, if it continues, to
injure consumers.
Part II of this article summarizes Easterbrook's observations about the limits
of antitrust and sets forth the overarching prescription that he advocates in light
of those limits. Part III then evaluates the Roberts Court's antitrust decisions
involving vertical restraints, exclusionary conduct, and antitrust enforcement.
Those decisions, Part III contends, are largely consistent with a limits of anti-
trust approach. Part IV considers a number of areas in which the antitrust
enforcement agencies have recently ignored-or at least downplayed-the limits
of antitrust, most likely to the detriment of consumers. Part V concludes.
II. ANTITRUST, ITS LIMITS, AND THE OPTIMAL APPROACH
TO DESIGNING LIABILITY RULES
When it comes to ensuring that consumers have access to lower-priced and
higher-quality goods and services, there is no better regulator than market
competition. The purpose of the antitrust laws then is to promote vigorous
competition among market participants. That does not imply, though, that
antitrust should try to maximize the number of competitors in a market or
prevent competitors from ever cooperating. Many markets exhibit economies
of scale, such that larger competitors produce at a lower per-unit cost than
their smaller rivals. If antitrust broke up large firms so that they could never
achieve the "minimum efficient scale" (that is, the point beyond which an in-
crease in output does not reduce per-unit costs),S production costs, and thus
prices, would be higher than necessary. In some markets, a few firms operating
at the minimum efficient scale can meet all consumer demand. Breaking up
large firms to create additional competitors in those markets would harm con-
sumers. Similarly, forbidding competitors from ever cooperating could harm
consumers by thwarting joint ventures that reduce costs, enhance quality, and
increase product variety. Consequently, in its quest to ensure competition,
antitrust should eschew simple mantras like "big is bad" and "cooperation
among competitors is unacceptable." Instead, antitrust should (and modern
antitrust generally does) embrace an output-focused understanding of competi-
tion, where markets are deemed more competitive when they produce more of
antitrust approach and, accordingly, are likely to occasion consumer harm. Analysis of such
restrictions, however, is beyond the ambit of this article.
Minimum efficient scale is the lowest production point at which long-run average costs are
minimized. See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 428 (1987).
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what consumers want, and at lower prices, and less competitive when they
produce less, and at higher prices.9 The chief goal of antitrust is and should be
to maximize competition, so understood.
Antitrust generally accomplishes this task by policing the two scenarios in
which competition breaks down. One is collusion, a situation in which
nominal competitors agree not to compete. The other is monopoly (or mon-
opsony), a state of affairs in which there is a single significant seller (or buyer).
The two most important provisions of the federal antitrust laws correspond to
those two paradigmatic defects in competition. Section 1 of the Sherman Act
addresses collusion, proclaiming that "[e]very contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce ...
is declared to be illegal." 10 Section 2 addresses monopoly, making it illegal to
"monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire ... to monop-
olize" any market.1 1
From the outset, these statutory texts have proven challenging for courts.
Interpreted literally, section 1 leads to an absurd result. The very essence of a
contract is to commit the parties to some course of action, thereby "restrain-
ing" them from exchanges that are inconsistent with that course. A ban on
"[e]very contract ... in restraint of trade" would cover virtually all contracts. 12
Recognizing as much, courts have long interpreted section 1 to forbid only
agreements that unreasonably restrain trade.1 3
Section 2 has posed a similar difficulty and engendered a similar judicial so-
lution. Section 2 wisely avoids forbidding monopoly itself, for many monop-
olies result from one firm offering a superior product that usurps business
from its rivals. Because shooting the winner is hardly the way to encourage
vigorous competition, section 2 prohibits not monopoly but monopolization,
which has been interpreted to require "exclusionary" conduct. 14 However, all
9 We refer here to quality-adjusted output. Therefore, a market development causing a slight
decrease in the number of units sold could be deemed procompetitive if it resulted in goods of
substantially higher quality (for which consumers would be willing to pay more).
10 15 U.S.C. 5 1. Clayton Act, section 7, perhaps the third most important provision of the federal
antitrust laws, similarly addresses agreements not to compete. That provision forbids any
business combination (for example, merger) whose effect "may be substantially to lessen
competition" in "any line of commerce." 15 U.S.C. 5 18.
1 15 U. S.C. 5 2.
12 See Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (reasoning that the term
"restraint of trade" in Section 1 cannot possibly refer to any restraint on competition, for
"[e]very agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains" and because "[t]o
bind, to restrain, is of their very essence").
13 Id. ("The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition.").
14 The elements of monopolization are "(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant
market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident." See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). The latter
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sorts of proconsumer business conduct is literally exclusionary. Building a
better mousetrap, or lowering the price on its existing mousetrap, will enable a
mousetrap manufacturer to gain additional business and thereby tend to
exclude rival mousetrap manufacturers. Courts have therefore interpreted the
exclusionary conduct element of the monopolization offense to require unrea-
sonably exclusionary conduct. The upshot of these interpretive developments
is that courts confronting antitrust challenges to novel business practices must
regularly make judgments about the overall desirability of the practices at
issue. In forming those judgments, they must ask such questions as, for
example, does the challenged practice constitute an "unreasonable" restraint
of trade? Is it "unreasonably" exclusionary?
The enforcement provisions of the antitrust laws guarantee that courts are
routinely called upon to decide such matters in private lawsuits. Section 4 of
the Clayton Act enables "any person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws" to sue for
damages in federal court.15 Moreover, a successful plaintiff is entitled not
merely to compensatory damages. Because many antitrust violations occur in
secret and are not successfully prosecuted, the Clayton Act seeks to optimize
deterrence by allowing a plaintiff to "recover threefold the damages by him
sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 16
In the end, then, antitrust consists of a body of law that attempts to maxi-
mize competition (understood in terms of long-run quality-adjusted market
output),1 7 is quite general in its literal prohibitions, becomes "fleshed out" by
generalist courts adjudicating largely private disputes, and is highly attractive
to private plaintiffs (and plaintiffs' lawyers) seeking treble damages. Taken to-
gether, these features constrain the social value antitrust regulation can ultim-
ately create. To see why that is so, consider the difficulties facing antitrust
adjudicators and the costs those difficulties produce.
element is usually referred to as "exclusionary" conduct. See, e.g., PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 3 ANTITRUST LAw ¶ 681 (3d ed. 2008) ("The 5 2 monopolizing
offense requires something more than the existence of monopoly power; the 'something more'
is generally referred to as an 'exclusionary practice."').
15 15 U.S.C. 5 15.
16 Id.
17 Antitrust aims to maximize market output in the long run. Numerous antitrust doctrines-such
as the rule that charging a monopoly price is not, in itself, illegal-confirm that antitrust is
focused on dynamic, long-run effects. See Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis
V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004). Monopoly pricing, after all, results in an immediate
reduction in market output. Nevertheless, a monopolist that has attained its monopoly
legitimately may charge monopoly prices because, as the Supreme Court has observed, the
prospect of charging monopoly prices tends to encourage innovation and thereby enhance long-
term market output. See id. ("[T]he ... charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful;
it is an important element of the free market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly
prices-at least for a short period-is what attracts 'business acumen' in the first place; it
induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth.").
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The first thing to note is that antitrust adjudication poses hard questions.
Challenges to concerted conduct-potential collusion-are often perplexing
because many output-enhancing business arrangements (for example, joint
ventures) involve cooperation among independent economic actors, often com-
petitors. Adjudicators must determine whether the coordinated arrangement at
issue is likely to increase market output, in which case the trade-restraining agree-
ment is reasonable, or reduce it, in which case the requisite unreasonableness
exists. In monopolization and attempted monopolization cases, adjudicators
must determine if conduct that won business for the defendant vis-A-vis its rivals
was just vigorous competition or crossed into unreasonable exclusion territory.
To draw the necessary distinctions, judges and juries generally must assess con-
flicting testimony from economic experts and reach conclusions on such compli-
cated subsidiary issues as the contours of the relevant market, the existence
and size of entry barriers, and the elasticities of demand and supply for the
product at issue.
There are thus significant costs in simply reaching a decision as to whether a
particular conduct violates the antitrust laws. If the conduct is challenged in
court, the parties themselves, with the aid of lawyers and economic experts,
must gather, process, and present a large amount of complex data. The jury or
judge must then deliberate over the information presented and decide both
subsidiary issues (for example, what exactly is the relevant market?) and the
outcome-determinative question (for example, is the conduct "unreasonably"
exclusionary?). Even before any court challenge, business planners must assess
the likelihood that their contemplated conduct may be deemed to violate the
antitrust laws. Taken together, the costs that business planners, litigating
parties, and adjudicators face in assessing and establishing the legality or il-
legality of a practice constitute antitrust's "decision costs."
Those are not the only costs associated with antitrust adjudication. Given
the difficulty of distinguishing collusion from output-enhancing cooperation
and unreasonably exclusionary conduct from vigorous competition, adjudica-
tors will certainly make mistakes in deciding antitrust cases. Those mistakes,
then, will themselves impose social costs. A mistaken acquittal of an anticom-
petitive practice-a false negative or "Type II error"-will tend to permit
market power that causes resources to be allocated away from their highest and
best uses.lS A mistaken conviction of a procompetitive practice-a false posi-
tive or "Type I error"-will squander social welfare by denying market partici-
pants the benefit of the efficient, wrongly condemned business practice. The
s Firms with market power are not constrained by competition into providing the maximum level
of value for consumers. They tend to allocate productive resources in a manner that maximizes
their profits but not overall social welfare. See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL
ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 19-26 (3d ed. 2005).
Such an "allocative inefficiency" is the primary adverse effect antitrust seeks to prevent.
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latter sort of error is likely to be more damaging in the long run.19 Whereas
market power, the result of a Type II error, tends to self-correct as firms enter
the market and expand output in response to higher prices, judicial condemna-
tion of an efficient practice will have economy-wide, not just market-wide,
effects and may be corrected only by a subsequent judicial decision or a legisla-
tive fix. 20 Nevertheless, both false convictions and false acquittals tend to
reduce social welfare, imposing "error costs."
Taken together, antitrust's decision and error costs comprise, in
Easterbrook's words, "the limits of antitrust." 2 1 They ultimately constrain what
the body of law can accomplish because they are in inexorable tension: efforts to
reduce one type of cost will tend to raise another. For example, courts cannot
streamline the factual inquiry required to assess whether some practice should
give rise to antitrust liability, thereby lowering decision costs, without increasing
the likelihood of error and thus error costs. If they try to reduce the risk of false
conviction (Type I error) by making it harder for a plaintiff to establish liability
or easier for a defendant to make out a defense, they will increase the likelihood
of false acquittal (Type II error). And if they ease a plaintiff s burden or cut back
on available defenses in order to reduce false acquittals, they will tend to
enhance social losses from false convictions. As in a game of whack-a-mole,
hammering down costs in one area will just cause them to turn up elsewhere.
In light of this unhappy situation, Easterbrook contended, tribunals should
give up trying to eliminate antitrust's inevitable and inexorable decision costs
and error costs and should instead attempt to optimize antitrust-that is, to
craft liability and procedural rules aimed at minimizing the sum of decision
and error costs. 2 2 Doing so will require tribunals to account for several factors.
A proffered rule's error costs are a function of both the probability that it will
lead to an incorrect judgment and the magnitude of loss that will result from
19 As Easterbrook pointed out,
[T]he conditions for useful legal intervention may be met when we know a lot about the
practice and can condemn or approve it out of hand. But when we know but little the risk
of error goes up, and the risk of false positives may be substantial. People are quick to
condemn what they do not understand. Hasty or uninformed judgments may condemn
novel practices just because of their novelty. Often it takes a decade or more to determine
what a business practice really does. The law moves too fast for our own good, because
courts act in advance of the explanation. Judges move slower than markets but faster than
the economics profession, a deadly combination.
Frank H. Easterbrook, Does Antitrust Have a Comparative Advantage?, 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 5, 8-9 (1999).
20 See Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 2-3 (contending that false convictions create greater social loss
than false acquittals).
21 Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 4.
22 Id. at 16 ("The legal system should be designed to minimize the total costs of (1)
anticompetitive practices that escape condemnation, (2) competitive practices that are
condemned or deterred, and (3) the system itself.").
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that sort of error. 23 Its decision costs are a function of its informational require-
ments and the ease with which it can be applied. An optimizing approach, then,
would account for (1) the likelihood that the proposed liability rule will produce
an incorrect judgment, (2) the magnitude of losses from the various errors that
the rule might generate, and (3) the difficulty of administering the rule. 24 By
carefully considering these factors and crafting liability rules calculated to min-
imize the sum of decision and error costs, tribunals could ensure that the inher-
ently limited antitrust enterprise generates as much social value as possible.
So how have the courts and enforcement agencies fared in harnessing
Easterbrook's insights to maximize antitrust's social value? The Roberts Court
seems largely to have recognized antitrust's limits and adopted rules consistent
with Easterbrook's overarching policy prescription. On the other hand, the en-
forcement agencies, at least in recent years, have taken a number of positions
at odds with a limits of antitrust approach.
III. THE ROBERTS COURT'S RECOGNITION OF THE LIMITS
OF ANTITRUST
Since its early days, 25 the Roberts Court has taken quite an interest in antitrust.
Whereas the Rehnquist Court decided one antitrust case from 1993 to 1995,
one each year from 1996 through 1999, and none from 2000 to 2003, the
Roberts Court decided seven antitrust cases in 2006 and 2007 alone. This part
examines the Roberts Court's decisions addressing vertical restraints of trade,
exclusionary conduct, and antitrust enforcement. It concludes that each is con-
sistent with an effort to limit the sum of antitrust's error and decision costs. 26
A. Vertical Restraints
Courts originally viewed vertical restraints of trade-trade-limiting agreements
between economic actors at different stages of the distribution process (for
23 Specifically, if P= the probability of an error, and M= the expected magnitude of loss from that
sort of error, then a proposed rule's error costs = (Pfale posive X Mfalse positive) + (Pfalse negative)X
Mfaise negative) *
24 Specifically, a tribunal should select the liability rule generating the lowest possible solution to the
following formula: Decision Costs + [(Pfase positve X Afase positive) + Pfakse negave X Mfalse negative)] -
25 Then Circuit Judge John Roberts became ChiefJustice of the United States Supreme Court on
September 29, 2005. See David Stout, Roberts Is Sworn in as Chief Justice of the U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2005, at 1A.
26 In addition to the antitrust decisions discussed here, the Roberts Court has decided three cases
involving horizontal restraints of trade. As one of us has elsewhere explained, two of those
decisions -Texaco Inc. v. Dagher (547 U.S. 1 (2006)) and American Needle, Inc. v. NFL (560 U.S.
183 (2010))-are consistent with an effort to minimize the sum of antitrust's error costs and
decision costs. See Thomas A. Lambert, The Roberts Court and the Limits of Antitrust, 52 B.C.L.
REv. 871, 906-09, 920-28 (2011). The third decision involving horizontal restraints, FTC
v. Actavis (133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013)) is admittedly difficult to square with a limits of antitrust
approach. The position espoused in the dissent by ChiefJustice Roberts seems to fit better with
Easterbrook's overarching policy prescription.
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example, between a manufacturer and a retailer)-with great suspicion. Under
what came to be known as the "inhospitality tradition," such restraints were
strictly policed under section 1 of the Sherman Act.2 7 The U.S. Supreme
Court's Dr. Miles decision, for example, declared "minimum resale price
maintenance" (RPM)-an arrangement in which a downstream seller agrees
to charge a minimum resale price for a manufacturer's product-to be per se
illegal. 28 RPM is an "intrabrand" vertical restraint because the manufacturer is
placing restraints on downstream trades of its own brand. Other decisions
strictly regulated "interbrand" vertical restraints, arrangements in which a pro-
ducer somehow restrains downstream trades in other brands. One such re-
straint is tying (or a "tie-in"), which involves a commitment by a purchaser of
one product (the "tying" product) also to buy from the seller a second product
(the "tied" product). A tie-in has the effect of restraining the purchaser from
buying other brands of the tied product. The U.S. Supreme Court has long
held that tying is per se illegal if the tie-in involves two separate products, the
producer possesses market power over the tying product, and the tie-in affects
a not insubstantial dollar volume of commerce in the tied product market.2 9 In
its 1984 Jefferson Parish decision, the Court suggested in dictum that the
27 See Alan J. Meese, Raising Rivals' Costs: Can the Agencies Do More Harm Than Good?, 12 GEO.
MAsoN L. REv. 241, 260 n.98 (2003). The term was apparently coined by Donald Turner,
who headed the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice in the 1960s. See Donald
F. Turner, Some Reflections on Antitrust, 1966 N.Y. ST. B.A. ANTITRUST L. SYMP. 1, 1-2 ("I
approach territorial and customer restrictions not hospitably in the common law tradition, but
inhospitably in the tradition of antitrust law.").
28 Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 400 (1911). Dr. Miles was just
the first in a long string of decisions displaying a hostility toward vertical restraints. In United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. (388 U.S. 365 (1967)) the Supreme Court declared vertical
non-price restraints-such as a manufacturer's requirement that its dealers sell only in certain
geographic territories or to particular customers-to be per se illegal. The following year, in
Albrecht v. Herald Co. (390 U.S. 145 (1968)) the Court declared maximum RPM to be per se
illegal. With respect to "interbrand" vertical restraints (defined in the text following this note),
the Court initially adopted a rule of near per se illegality for exclusive dealing arrangements
involving more than a small amount of market foreclosure. See Standard Oil of Cal. v. United
States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (condemning exclusive dealing arrangement that foreclosed
defendant's rivals from 6.7 percent of marketing outlets). The Court also adopted a "quasi-per
se rule" (discussed infra at note 28 and accompanying text) against tying. See Fortner
Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969). By the time of Chief Justice
Roberts' ascension, the Court had liberalized the rules governing all vertical restraints except
minimum RPM, which remained subject to the rule of Dr. Miles, and tying, which is still
subject to the quasi-per se rule. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9
(1984) ("It is far too late in the history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition
that certain tying arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition and therefore are
unreasonable per se."). Notably, a number of states remain inhospitable to vertical restraints. See,
e.g., John R. Foote & Blair Z. Russell, Resale Price Maintenance: Per se Antitrust Treatment Alive in
the States, 27 WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Oct. 19, 2012), http://
www.wlf.org/upload/legalstudies/legalbackgrounder/1 0-19-12FooteLegalBackgrounder.pdf.
29 See, e.g., Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp. (Fortner I), 394 U.S. 495, 501, 503
(1969); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1992).
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market power element of this "quasi-per se rule" is satisfied if the tying product
is subject to a patent.30 The upshot was that any producer who sold a patented
product on the condition that a buyer also purchase some other product was in
danger of antitrust liability.
The error costs stemming from Dr. Miles and the Jefferson Parish dictum were
significant. Economists have long understood that minimum RPM, per se illegal
under Dr. Miles, may be employed for a number of output-enhancing ends: to
prevent discount dealers from free-riding on high-service (and, thus, higher-
priced) dealers' demand-enhancing services, 3 1 to facilitate entry of new brands
by guaranteeing a certain retail mark-up to pioneer retailers, 32 and to encourage
dealers to use their own initiative to promote the producer's (high-margin)
brand over rival brands. 33 The circumstances in which RPM may achieve these
output-enhancing purposes are quite common. By contrast, the pre-conditions
to RPM's potential anticompetitive harms-facilitation of manufacturer or
retailer cartels and exclusion of competition by dominant manufacturers or
retailers-rarely exist.34 Not surprisingly, then, the empirical evidence on RPM
has suggested that it is more often procompetitive (output-enhancing) than antic-
ompetitive (output-reducing).3 The old rule of Dr. Miles, dutifully followed for
nearly a century, therefore injured consumers by creating large Type I error costs
(that is, losses from false convictions of procompetitive conduct).
Jefferson Parish's presumption that possession of a patent on a tying product
creates the market power necessary for per se illegality similarly generated huge
error costs. As an initial matter, it is now well-understood that tie-ins are not,
30 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984) (observing that "if the
Government has granted the seller a patent or similar monopoly over a product, it is fair to
presume that the inability to buy the product elsewhere gives the seller market power").
31 See Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 86, 91-93
(1960); see also Robert Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price-Fixing and Market
Division (Part 1), 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966).
32 See Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, The Economics of Resale Price Maintenance, in 3 ISSUES
IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1841, 1848 (Wayne D. Collins ed., 2008) ("To secure
entry, a new entrant may seek to gain retail distribution by offering independent retailers
protections against discounting, in the hope that margin protection will induce retailers to
market and promote the new product.").
3 See Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms,
31 J.L. & EcoN. 265 (1988).
34 See Thomas A. Lambert, A Decision-Theoretic Rule of Reason for Minimum Resale Price
Maintenance, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 167, 174-76 (2010) (summarizing RPM's potential
anticompetitive harms); id. at 181-84 (cataloguing prerequisites to potential anticompetitive
harms from RPM).
3 See generally Thomas A. Lambert, Dr. Miles Is Dead. Now What?: Structuring a Rule of Reason
for Evaluating Minimum Resale Price Maintenance, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1937, 1989-92
(2009) (summarizing empirical evidence on RPM's competitive effects); see also Pauline
M. Ippolito, Resale Price Maintenance: Empirical Evidence from Litigation, 34 J.L. & ECoN. 263
(1991); Stanley I. Ornstein, Resale Price Maintenance and Cartels, 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 401,
431 (1985); THOMAs R. OVERSTREET, JR., RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: EcoNoMIC
THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE (1983).
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as the Supreme Court once believed, always or almost always anticompeti-
tive. 3 6 Indeed, tie-ins might (1) help protect the tying product's quality and
reputation (by ensuring that only high-quality complements are used);3 7 (2)
facilitate output-enhancing price discrimination (as heavy users of the tying
product effectively pay more by buying more of the tied complement, thereby
enabling the seller to charge lower prices for the tying product so that consu-
mers with a lower willingness-to-pay enter the market);3 and (3) enable pro-
ducers to evade rate regulation on the tying product by imposing a tie-in and
then hiking the price of that product (such regulation is often, though not
always, output-reducing) .3 Tie-ins threaten real anticompetitive harm only
when they result in a substantial foreclosure of sales opportunities to rivals in
the tied product market. 40 Because that situation rarely exists and is easily
identified, the quasi-per se rule against tying is itself unwise and should be
replaced with a more probing Rule of Reason that assesses whether the particu-
lar tie-in at issue is likely to reduce rather than enhance overall market output.
Even if some sort ofper se rule against tying by those possessing market power
were appropriate, the presumption that the mere possession of a patent on a
tying product confers tying market power is ludicrous. Most patents confer no
market power.4 1 Given the huge percentage of products incorporating some
36 See Thomas A. Lambert, Appropriate Liability Rules for Tying and Bundled Discounting, 72 OHIO
ST. L.J. 909, 934-58 (2011) (discussing economics of tying).
3 See, e.g., Margaret E. Slade, The Leverage Theory of Tying Revisited: Evidence from Newspaper
Advertising, 65 So. EcoN. J. 204, 208 (1998); William E. Baxter & Daniel P. Kessler, Toward a
Consistent Theory of the Welfare Analysis of Agreements, 47 STAN. L. REv. 615, 621 (1995);
RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES, AND
OTHER MATERIALS 808-09 (1981); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOx: A POLICY
AT WAR WITH ITSELF 379-80 (1978). But see Edward M. Iaocobucci, Tying as Quality Control:
A Legal and Economic Analysis, 32 J. LEGAL STUDS. 435 (2003) (questioning quality-control
rationales for tying).
38 See Benjamin Klein & John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Competitive Price Discrimination as an Antitrust
Justification for Intellectual Property Refusals to Deal, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 599, 612-13 (2002);
Lambert, supra note 35, at 935-50.
3 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Class Actions, 36 VAND. L. REv. 213, 234
(1983) ("Tying arrangements in price-regulated industries may be efficiency creating.");
Thomas B. Leary, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Law as a Balancing Act
Address (Dec. 17, 1999), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/leary991217.shtm (discussing the
use of tie-ins to evade price regulation and observing that "[w]hile regulatory evasion [via tying]
may supply the motive for particular conduct that may be otherwise inexplicable, it does not
constitute independent evidence of competitive harm").
40 See Lambert, supra note 35, at 926-62.
41 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 374 (2003); Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Patent Misuse and Antitrust
Reform: "Blessed Be the Tie?", 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 57, 57 n.340 (1991) (observing that
presumption of market power from possession of patent has been extensively criticized and
citing sources); see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND U.S. FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 4
(1995), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf (" [t]he [federal antitrust] [a]
gencies will not presume that a [p]atent ... necessarily confers market power upon its owner.").
802 Journal of Competition Law & Economics
patented feature, a rule deeming patents to confer market power effectively
renders many or most tie-ins per se illegal. And since tie-ins are usually procom-
petitive rather than anticompetitive, such a rule generates tremendous error
cost.
In its early days, the Roberts Court took steps to stem the error costs flowing
from both Jefferson Parish's improvident dictum and the holding of Dr. Miles.
In its 2006 Independent Ink decision, the Court addressed tying.42 Recognizing
that many patents confer no market power whatsoever,43 it held that the mere
possession of a patent covering the tying product cannot establish the market
power necessary to render a tie-in per se illegal.4 4 Perhaps more significantly,
the Court expressly acknowledged that the use of tying to achieve price dis-
crimination, which is often output-enhancing, 45 is not inherently suspect. 46
The following year, the Court addressed minimum RPM. Its 2007 Leegin deci-
sion held that the practice, which offers a number of procompetitive benefits,
would no longer be per se illegal but must instead be evaluated under the Rule
of Reason. 4 7
By constraining the scope of one highly error-prone per se rule (that against
tying) and altogether overruling another (that against minimum RPM), the
Court substantially reduced the error costs occasioned by antitrust's rules on
vertical restraints. Because that error-cost reduction would likely dwarf any in-
crease in decision costs, Independent Ink and Leegin are wholly consistent with
Easterbrook's directive. 48
B. Exclusionary Conduct
The Roberts Court has decided two cases involving unilateral conduct alleged
to be unreasonably exclusionary in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.
In each, the Court embraced clear, administrable liability rules that are likely
to reduce the sum of error and decision costs.
The issue in the Court's Weyerhaeuser decision was what standard should
govern "predatory bidding" claims. 49 In a predatory bidding case, a buyer bids
up the price of some input higher than the level necessary to acquire all the
buyer needs. Its purpose in doing so is to drive out rival input buyers who
cannot afford to pay the higher input price. Once rival buyers are eliminated,
the bidder may gain monopsony power (buyer-side market power), enabling it
42 Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
43 Id. at 44 (observing that "the vast majority of academic literature recognizes that a patent does
not necessarily confer market power").
44 Id. at 31.
45 See Lambert, supra note 35, at 935-50.
46 Independent Ink, 547 U.S. at 43-45.
47 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886-87 (2007).
48 See generally Lambert, supra note 25, at 880-91, 902-06 (explaining how holdings of Leegin and
Independent Ink help minimize sum of error and decision costs).
49 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007).
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to drive input prices below competitive levels.5 0 The issue before the Court was
whether plaintiffs complaining of predatory bidding should be required to show
(1) that the defendant's bidding behavior caused its output to be priced below
cost (given the inflated prices the defendant paid for inputs), and (2) that the de-
fendant could likely recoup its losses from below-cost output prices by paying
monopsonistic (artificially low) prices after driving out rival input buyers.5 1 The
Court of Appeals had rejected that rule, 52 which mirrors the liability rule that
the Supreme Court adopted for predatory pricing in its Brooke Group decision. 53
The lower court instead approved a jury instruction that would have imposed li-
ability had the defendant "purchased more [inputs] than it needed or paid a
higher price for [inputs] than necessary, in order to prevent [rival buyers] from
obtaining the [inputs] they needed at a fair price." 54
In reversing the Court of Appeals and endorsing the two-part liability rule
set forth above, the Court expressly invoked concerns about error costs. It
began by observing that the analogous Brooke Group liability rule for predatory
pricing was itself premised not on a belief that low but above-cost pricing can
never be anticompetitive, 55 but instead on a desire to avoid error costs from
false convictions of procompetitive discounting:
The first prong of the [Brooke Group] test-requiring that prices be below cost-is necessary
because "[a]s a general rule, the exclusionary effect of prices above a relevant measure of
cost either reflects the lower cost structure of the alleged predator, and so represents compe-
tition on the merits, or is beyond the practical ability of a judicial tribunal to control." We were
50 See id. at 320-21 (explaining strategy behind predatory bidding).
5' Id. at 317-18.
52 Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 411 F.3d 1030, 1035-36 (9th Cir.
2005).
5 See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222, 224 (1993)
(holding that plaintiff complaining of predatory pricing must establish that (1) "the prices
complained of [were] below an appropriate measure of its [defendant] rival's costs," and (2)
there was a "dangerous probability" at the time of the below-cost pricing that the rival would
eventually "recoup [] its investment" in the predation by charging supracompetitive prices).
54 Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 317 (stating jury instruction lower court had approved).
5 It is well understood that so-called "limit" pricing, which occurs when a firm with market
power sets its prices above its costs but below the profit-maximizing level so as to deter entry,
can be anticompetitive. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE
AND EXECUTION 161-62 (2005). Whereas such pricing may impose competitive harm and
injure consumers in the long run, it is simply too difficult for antitrust tribunals to police. As
Herbert Hovenkamp has observed, "No court has ever developed a workable test for
determining when an above-cost price is anticompetitive." Id. at 162. Moreover, there is the
problem of fashioning a remedy. Forcing the defendant to raise its price to the monopoly level
to invite new entry poses serious risks to consumers if, for example, entry does not occur
instantly. Alternatively, forcing the defendant to lower its price to competitive levels would
make eventual entry even less likely and would "put the court in the position of a regulatory
agency, constantly monitoring the dominant firm's prices to ensure that they stayed near the
competitive level." Id.
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particularly wary of allowing recovery for above-cost price cutting because allowing such
claims could, perversely, "chilfl] legitimate price cutting," which directly benefits consumers.
The Court then observed that bidding up the price of inputs, like lowering the
price of one's output, might occur for "myriad legitimate reasons-ranging
from benign to affirmatively procompetitive." 5 7 To avoid chilling non-harmful
instances of aggressive input buying or bidding, the Court reasoned, the liability
rule should include a safe harbor for any input bidding that an equally efficient
output producer could match. If the defendant's output was still priced above
the defendant's cost even after the defendant had bid up input prices, then any
equally efficient output producer could match the purportedly inflated input
price and should not be excluded by the bidding behavior. Thus, the Court con-
cluded, a predatory bidding plaintiff should have to prove that the complained
of bidding resulted in below-cost pricing in the output market.5S Not only
would this rule reduce error costs by providing a safe harbor for procompetitive
input-bidding, it would also lower decision costs. After all, the alternative rule
imposing liability if a defendant "purchased more [inputs] than necessary, in
order to prevent [input market rivals] from obtaining the [inputs] they needed at
a fair price"59 would open the door to long and costly expeditions to establish
the number of inputs "needed," the price "necessary" to obtain such a quantity,
the motives of the defendant in making its bids, and the "fair" price that should
have been guaranteed to the defendant's rivals. Weyerhaeuser thus had the effect
of lowering the sum of error and decision costs in predatory bidding cases.
Soon after deciding Weyerhaeuser, the Court applied Easterbrook's directive
to so-called "price squeezes." Suppose that a firm (1) sells both some finished
product (for example, fabricated aluminum pieces) and an input that goes into
creating that product (for example, aluminum ingot), and (2) possesses monop-
oly power in the input (upstream) market. If such a "vertically integrated mon-
opolist" were simultaneously to raise the price of its input and lower, or perhaps
hold constant, its price in the output (downstream) market, then it could
"squeeze" the profit margins of its downstream market rivals; they would have
no choice but to buy its high-priced input, yet would be constrained from
raising their output prices. In an early and famous monopolization decision,
56 Id. at 319 (second and third alterations in original) (emphasis added) (citations omitted)
(quoting Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 223).
5 Id. at 323. For example, a firm buying up inputs in a manner that increases their price might (1)
simply miscalculate its input needs; (2) anticipate increased consumer demand for its output;
(3) face different efficiencies than its input market rivals (for example, it may be able to extract
greater value from the input, which would cause it to value the input more, or it may use a
particularly input-intensive production process, which would cause it to have greater input
needs); or (4) seek to acquire excess inputs as a hedge against future price increases. Id.
5 Id. at 325.
5 Id. at 317 (stating liability rule approved by lower court).
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Judge Learned Hand held that such a price squeeze could amount to unreason-
ably exclusionary conduct.6 0
In Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 61 the Roberts
Court disagreed. It held that there can be no liability based on a mere price
squeeze when (1) the defendant does not have an independent antitrust duty
to deal with upstream rivals seeking to buy its input and (2) the price of the
defendant's output remains above-cost.62 In reaching that conclusion, the
Court relied on two precedents, both of which reflect concerns about error
and decision costs.
The first of those precedents was the Court's 2004 Tinko decision, which
declined to impose on upstream monopolists a general duty to deal with their
downstream rivals (for example, a monopolist producer of aluminum ingots
who also sells fabricated aluminum products has no general antitrust duty to
sell ingot to rival producers of fabricated aluminum products) .63 In so
holding, the Tinko Court invoked concerns about error costs and decision
costs. With respect to the former, it observed that a broad rule requiring mono-
polists to deal upstream with their downstream rivals could generate numerous
and costly errors by encouraging collusion and reducing downstream firms'
incentives to innovate. 64 A broad forced-sharing rule would also entail high de-
cision costs, for "[e]nforced sharing ... requires antitrust courts to act as
central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of
dealing-a role for which they are ill suited." 65 Because the sum of error costs
and decision costs would be higher under a general rule requiring vertically
integrated monopolists to deal in the upstream market with their downstream
rivals, the Tinko Court wisely rejected such a rule.
The other precedent on which linkLine was based was Brooke Group, which
also reflects limits of antitrust thinking. As observed above, Brooke Group's
holding that there can be no predatory pricing liability absent below-cost
60 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 436-37 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.).
The defendant in the case, Alcoa, was the monopoly producer of aluminum ingot and also sold
rolled (sheet) aluminum in a competitive market. The government alleged that Alcoa had raised
the price of ingot without increasing its price for sheet aluminum, thereby squeezing the profits
of other aluminum sheet producers, who had to buy their ingot from Alcoa at inflated prices but
could not raise their sheet price because of competition from Alcoa. Id. at 437 ("The plaintiffs
theory is that 'Alcoa' consistently sold ingot at so high a price that the 'sheet rollers,' who were
forced to buy from it, could not pay the expenses of 'rolling' the 'sheet' and make a living profit
out of the price at which 'Alcoa' itself sold 'sheet."').
61 555 U.S. 438 (2009).
62 Id. at 457.
63 Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 408-11 (2004).
64 Id. at 407-08 ("Compelling such firms to share the source of their advantage is in some tension
with the underlying purpose of the antitrust law, since it may lessen the incentive for the
monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those economically beneficial facilities. ... Moreover,
compelling negotiation between competitors may facilitate the supreme evil of antitrust:
collusion.").
65 Id. at 408.
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pricing and a likelihood of recoupment was premised not on a belief that low
but above-cost prices can never be anticompetitive but instead on skepticism
about the judiciary's ability to regulate such prices without chilling procompe-
titive price competition. 66 That is ultimately a concern about error costs. In
addition, the Brooke Group test constrains decision costs, for inquiries into
whether a defendant's prices are below its costs and whether recoupment
would be likely within the market at issue, though complicated, are likely to be
less costly than an inquiry into whether the defendant has attempted to pre-
clude entry by pricing below its profit-maximizing level, which is extremely dif-
ficult to ascertain. 67
At the end of the day, the linkLine Court reasoned that a plaintiff complain-
ing of neither a violation of some particular duty to deal with rivals (there is no
general antitrust duty to do so) nor predatory pricing cannot succeed by claim-
ing that the defendant simultaneously sold to the plaintiff (with which it had
no duty to deal at all) at too high a price and to downstream purchasers at too
low a price. As Chief Justice Roberts explained,
Plaintiffs' price-squeeze claim ... is ... nothing more than an amalgamation of a meritless
claim at the retail level and a meritless claim at the wholesale level. If there is no duty to deal
at the wholesale level and no predatory pricing at the retail level, then a firm is certainly not
required to price both of these services in a manner that preserves its rivals' margins.
Because each of the decisions precluding liability on the two parts of a price
squeeze plaintiffs claim-Trinko and Brooke Group-was crafted to reduce the
sum of error and decision costs, so was linkLine itself.
C. Enforcement
The Roberts Court has decided four antitrust cases focusing not on substan-
tive standards of liability for specific business practices but on antitrust en-
forcement generally. Each of the cases, Bell Atlantic Co. v. Twombly, 6 9 Credit
Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing,70 FTC v. Phoebe Putney,7 1 and North
Carolina Dental v. FTC 72 is consistent with an effort to minimize the sum of
error costs and decision costs.
1. Twombly
Twombly, which required so-called "plausibility" pleading in antitrust conspir-
acy claims, is to many observers one of the Roberts Court's most notorious
66 See supra notes 54-55 and the accompanying text.
67 See Hovenkamp, supra note 54, at 162-64 (discussing difficulty of policing "limit" pricing).
68 Pac. Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Commc'ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 452 (2009).
69 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
70 551 U.S. 264 (2007).
71 133 S. Ct. 1003 (2013).
72 135 S. Ct. 1101, 2015 WL 773331 (Feb. 25, 2015).
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decisions. Its infamy likely stems from two factors. First, it deals with pleading
standards, an issue in every lawsuit. In addition, the Supreme Court later
upped the ante by extending Twombly's plausibility standard beyond the anti-
trust conspiracy context.7 3 Putting aside Twombly's later extension and focus-
ing solely on its implications for antitrust lawsuits, however, the decision
represents a sensible effort to minimize the sum of antitrust's error costs and
decision costs.
At issue in Twombly was whether a plaintiff adequately pleads a "contract,
combination ... , or conspiracy" for purposes of a section 1 action merely by al-
leging parallel conduct and baldly asserting that participants must have con-
spired to act the same way. The plaintiffs conceded that mere parallel conduct
plus an allegation of conspiracy would not enable them to survive a defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment; to survive a motion for summary judg-
ment, they would need to prove facts tending to exclude non-collusive
explanations for the alleged conspirators' parallel conduct.7 4 Plaintiffs main-
tained, though, that they were not required to set forth such facts at the pleading
stage.7 5 The Supreme Court disagreed. It held that a section 1 complaint
should be dismissed for failure to allege the agreement element ("contract,
combination ... , or conspiracy") if all it alleges is parallel conduct coupled with
a bald assertion of conspiracy. 76 To survive a motion to dismiss, a section 1
plaintiff must make non-conclusory allegations "plausibly suggesting (not
merely consistent with) agreement," 7 7 which implies that a plaintiff seeking to
plead agreement with allegations of parallel conduct must, at a minimum,
allege "plus factors" suggesting that the parallelism is more likely the product
of agreement than of independent action.
The error costs and decision costs that would have resulted from a prece-
dent allowing the Twombly plaintiffs' claim (and thus others like it) to proceed
to discovery would have been quite large. As plaintiffs' lawyers know, discovery
in antitrust cases can be extremely costly for defendants and, when coupled
with just a slight chance that treble damages will be imposed, may induce
settlement of even non-meritorious actions. Had the Twombly Court allowed a
mere allegation of parallel conduct and a bald assertion of conspiracy to com-
prise the agreement element of a section 1 claim, the antitrust plaintiffs' bar
would have been encouraged to search out parallel business conduct (like the
parallel failure of competitors to pursue some assertedly profitable business
opportunity), make a naked assertion that defendants had "conspired" to
7 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
74 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 595-98 (1986).
7 Bell Atlantic Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560-61 (2007).
76 Id. at 569-70.
77Id. at 557.
78 Parallel failure to pursue a profitable business opportunity was one of the bases for plaintiffs'
conspiracy allegation in Twombly. See id. at 551 (according to plaintiffs, agreement was "to be
inferred from the ILECs' common failure 'meaningfully [to] pursu [e]' 'attractive business
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engage in such conduct (or non-conduct), prepare onerous discovery
requests, and hope to extract a settlement. The error costs stemming from a
procedural rule encouraging such non-meritorious strike suits could be tre-
mendous. Decision costs would also be significant under a rule that prevented
unfounded antitrust conspiracy claims from being disposed of on relatively
cheap motions to dismiss but instead required that the parties go through
costly discovery before the defendant could terminate the lawsuit through
summary judgment.
The error costs and decision costs entailed by the Twombly Court's holding
are likely to be significantly lower than those that would have resulted had the
Twombly plaintiffs (and thus others like them) been allowed to proceed with
their claims. Any errors resulting from Twombly will consist of false negatives-
improper dismissals of meritorious conspiracy claims. Plaintiffs can avoid dis-
missal under Twombly by alleging either (1) facts showing an actual agreement
or (2) consciously parallel conduct plus facts suggesting that the parallel behav-
ior is more likely the product of agreement than unilateral action. That means
that the only antitrust conspiracy claims barred by Twombly are those involving
no known agreement and no "plus factors" that imply a collusive explanation for
parallel conduct. Pre-complaint investigation of legitimate claims should usually
reveal either sufficient facts to make a non-conclusory allegation of agreement or
economic factors tending to exclude the possibility that parallel conduct resulted
from independent, unilateral actions. And even if a legitimate claim was dis-
missed under Twombly, plaintiffs (and others similarly situated) could continue
to monitor the situation and file suit if and when they uncovered facts suggesting
an actual agreement or establishing plus factors. Because cartels are fragile and
generally cannot be maintained without some policing efforts, it is likely that
plaintiffs monitoring genuine collusion would eventually uncover facts that,
when pled, would enable meritorious conspiracy claims to proceed.
The decision costs stemming from Twombly's holding are also likely to be
lower than those that would otherwise have resulted. Although Twombly may
have the effect of forcing multiple complaints and motions to dismiss, it avoids
the much greater cost associated with protracted discovery and expensive
summary judgment proceedings to dispose of meritless collusion claims based
solely on parallel conduct and conclusory conspiracy allegations. Twombly's
holding is thus fully consistent with an approach seeking to minimize the sum
of antitrust's error and decision costs.
2. Credit Suisse
Because antitrust is not an industry-specific body of law, its reach may overlap
with regulation focused on specific industries or behaviors. In such contexts,
opportunit [ies]' in contiguous markets where they possessed 'substantial competitive
advantages') (quotations and alterations in original).
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antitrust liability may be redundant, providing no added social value, or may
even undermine the regulatory regime with which it overlaps. In Credit
Suisse,7 9 the Roberts Court confronted such an instance of regulatory overlap
and had to decide whether social welfare would be enhanced by staying anti-
trust's hand. In concluding that a private antitrust action seeking treble
damages was implicitly precluded by the federal securities laws, the Court ex-
pressly invoked concerns about error and decision costs. so
At issue in Credit Suisse were certain initial public offering (IPO) marketing
practices that were arguably unreasonable restraints of trade among competi-
tors (section 1 violations) but were also regulated by the federal securities laws
and subject to active monitoring by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). Given the implied preclusion standard set forth in prior Supreme
Court precedents, the key question was whether permitting an antitrust action
based on the practices would risk conflicting guidance, requirements, or stan-
dards for regulatees.81 The plaintiffs maintained that no such conflict could
result because the SEC had already disapproved of the complained-of activities
and would likely continue to do so into the foreseeable future.82 In rejecting
that reasoning and concluding that maintenance of the antitrust action would
be incompatible with the securities laws, the Court made little effort to identify
specific points of conflict between the securities and antitrust laws. Instead, it
compared the expected error costs of permitting the type of action at issue to
the expected error costs of deeming such actions to be impliedly precluded.83
Even assuming that the SEC would continue to disapprove of the practices
at issue, the Court reasoned, antitrust actions based on those practices would
likely generate false condemnations (Type I errors). Identifying several factors
that make it difficult to separate legal from illegal behavior in this context,84
the Court explained:
7 Credit Suisse Secs. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007).
so Id. at 278-85.
s1 As the Court explained, its prior precedents on securities law preemption of antitrust had
established that an antitrust action is implicitly precluded when it is "clearly incompatible" with
the securities laws. Id. at 271-75 (summarizing precedents). Four factors are relevant in
determining whether such incompatibility exists: (1) whether the challenged practice lies
squarely within an area of financial market activity that the securities laws seek to regulate; (2)
whether an administrative body has legal authority to supervise the practice; (3) whether the
regulator has, in fact, exercised its regulatory authority; and (4) whether permitting the antitrust
action would risk conflicting guidance, requirements, or standards. Id. at 275. With respect to
the complaint before the Court, no one could "reasonably dispute" that the first three factors
favored preclusion; accordingly, the primary question before the Court was whether the
plaintiffs complaint threatened to create a conflict between antitrust and securities law. Id.
82 Id. at 278.
I3 d. at 279-84.
84 The Court identified four factors that, taken together, "make mistakes unusually likely" in this
context. Id. at 281. The factors are: (1) the fine distinctions between permissible and
impermissible conduct in the securities marketing context, id. at 279 (" [O]nly a fine, complex,
detailed line separates activity that the SEC permits or encourages (for which respondents must
810 Journal of Competition Law & Economics
Together these factors mean there is no practical way to confine antitrust suits so that they
challenge only activity of the kind the investors seek to target, activity that is presently un-
lawful and will likely remain unlawful under the securities law. Rather, these factors suggest
that antitrust courts are likely to make unusually serious mistakes in this respect. And the
threat of antitrust mistakes, i.e., results that stray outside the narrow bounds that plaintiffs
seek to set, means that underwriters must act in ways that will avoid not simply conduct that
the securities law forbids (and will likely continue to forbid), but also a wide range of
conduct that the securities law permits or encourages (but which they fear could lead to an
antitrust lawsuit and the risk of treble damages). 5
The Court then turned to consider the magnitude of social loss from the likely
errors. It concluded that false condemnations would create significant social
costs in the context at hand, for "the role that joint conduct plays in respect to
the marketing of IPOs, along with the important role IPOs themselves play in
relation to the effective functioning of capital markets means that the
securities-related costs of mistakes is unusually high.",86
Having determined that permitting plaintiffs antitrust action would create
significant Type I error costs (a high probability of false convictions times a
large magnitude of loss from such convictions), the Court compared those
expected costs to the Type II error costs likely to result if the Court deemed
the action to be impliedly preempted. The costs associated with such errors,
the Court concluded, would likely be relatively small. First, if the conduct was
already forbidden by the SEC, as the plaintiffs assumed, securities lawsuits
could stop the offensive practices.87 Moreover, because the securities laws
already require the SEC "to take account of competitive considerations when
it creates securities-related policy and embodies it in rules and regulations,"
concede antitrust immunity) from activity that the SEC must (and inevitably will) forbid (and
which, on respondents' theory, should be open to antitrust attack)."); (2) the need for
securities-related expertise, which generalist courts lack, to draw these distinctions and to
determine whether, in fact, the SEC's disapproval of a complained of practice is likely to remain
permanent, id. at 280-81 (" [T]o distinguish what is forbidden from what is allowed requires an
understanding of just when, in relation to services provided, a commission is 'excessive,'
indeed, so 'excessive' that it will remain permanently forbidden. And who but the SEC itself
could do so with confidence?") (internal citation omitted); (3) the fact that the evidence
presented in antitrust lawsuits arising from securities marketing practices would likely permit
contradictory, but mutually reasonable, inferences, id. at 281 ("[E]vidence tending to show
unlawful antitrust activity and evidence tending to show lawful securities marketing activity may
overlap, or prove identical."); and (4) the high risk of inconsistent court results as antitrust
plaintiffs "bring lawsuits throughout the Nation in dozens of different courts with different
nonexpert judges and different nonexpert juries," id.
85 Id. at 282; see also id. ("This kind of problem exists to some degree in respect of other antitrust
lawsuits. But here the factors we have mentioned make mistakes unusually likely (a matter
relevant to Congress' determination of which institution should regulate a particular set of
market activities).").
86 Id.
87 Id. at 283 ("For one thing, the SEC actively enforces the rules and regulations that forbid the
conduct in question. For another, ... investors harmed by underwriters' unlawful practices may
bring lawsuits and obtain damages under the securities law.").
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there is less need for antitrust to intervene to thwart anticompetitive prac-
tices. Accordingly, antitrust liability in this context adds little social value,
and social losses from reining in its reach so much that it fails to capture some
anticompetitive conduct would be relatively low.
It was thus an explicit analysis of error costs-comparing the costs of too
much versus too little antitrust intervention-that led the Credit Suisse Court to
conclude that there was an inevitable conflict between the sort of antitrust action
at issue and the effective implementation of the securities laws. Although the
Court did not expressly analyze likely decision costs, consideration of such costs
would only have bolstered its conclusion, for a legal regime permitting plaintiffs
to choose between two types of lawsuits (involving very different substantive
doctrine, procedural rules, and damages formulae) in challenging a single set of
business practices would almost certainly involve higher decision costs than a
regime that dealt with such practices under a single body of law. The reasoning
of Credit Suisse thus adheres to Easterbrook's directive to minimize the sum of
error and decision costs in antitrust adjudication.
3. Phoebe Putney
Phoebe Putney involved the scope of state action immunity-that is, the degree to
which entities acting pursuant to state authority will be exempt from antitrust li-
ability. The Supreme Court has long recognized that states should have freedom
to pursue public policies without fear that their efforts will run afoul of the
federal antitrust laws. For that reason, the Sherman Act does not bar states from
imposing market restraints "as an act of government." 9 When a substate entity
(for example, a local governmental unit) is acting under state authority, its
actions will be immune from federal antitrust law only if they are undertaken
pursuant to a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy to dis-
place competition. 0 That does not mean, though, that a state legislature must
"expressly state in a statute or its legislative history that the legislature intends for
the delegated action to have anticompetitive effects"; instead, the "clear articula-
tion" test will be satisfied as long as the anticompetitive effect was the "foresee-
able result" of what the state authorized.9 1
The central issue in Phoebe Putney was whether a competition-reducing
merger that would otherwise violate the antitrust laws was a "foreseeable result"
of a state's granting of general corporate powers-including the power to buy
and sell competing businesses (hospitals, in this case)-to a substate entity. The
Court of Appeals had held that it was, because the state legislature could have
foreseen that a local government entity with express power to acquire hospitals
88Id.
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350, 352 (1943).
90 Community Commc'ns Co. v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 52 (1982).
91 Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 42-43 (1985).
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might engage in competition-reducing acquisitions. 92 Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals concluded, a hospital combination orchestrated by the local hospital au-
thority was immune from antitrust scrutiny.93
The Supreme Court disagreed. In a unanimous opinion, the Court ruled
that the lower court had "applied the concept of 'foreseeability' from [the]
clear-articulation test too loosely." 94 It is not enough, the Court reasoned, for
the state simply to grant general corporate powers, even acquisition authority.
The Court explained, "When a State grants some entity general power to act,
whether it is a private corporation or a public entity like the [local hospital]
Authority, it does so against the backdrop of federal antitrust law."9 5 Thus, the
state implicitly assumes that the delegated power will be exercised consistently
with the federal antitrust laws unless the power being delegated-like a zoning
power that cannot be exercised without restraining trade and dividing markets
-is inherently inconsistent with free competition. The upshot of this ruling is
that state action immunity for substate entities will exist only if the legislature
expressly contemplated a displacement of competition or "the displacement of
competition was the inherent, logical, or ordinary result of the exercise of the
authority delegated by the state legislature." 9 6
This holding is consistent with an approach aimed at minimizing antitrust's
error and decision costs. Allowing a state's granting of general corporate powers
to immunize a substate entity from antitrust liability simply because the granted
power could be exercised in an anticompetitive fashion would generate a signifi-
cant number of false acquittals and thus a great deal of Type II error (that is,
market power from failure to condemn truly anticompetitive practices). The
Court's holding avoids those error costs without significantly increasing the like-
lihood of false convictions. After all, any state legislature seeking to stay anti-
trust's hand in order to pursue other laudable policies could simply express its
desire to displace competition with the legislation delegating authority to the
substate entity. Such intentional displacement of competition is likely to be un-
common, but it can be easily accomplished when desired. Phoebe Putney thus
reduces total error costs by substantially decreasing the incidence of Type II
errors without significantly increasing the likelihood of Type I errors.
4. North Carolina Dental
The Court's most recent antitrust decision also addressed state action immun-
ity. In North Carolina Dental,9 7 the Court considered the extent of a state's
92 Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 663 F.3d 1369, 1377 (11th Cir.
2011).
93Id. at 1378.
94 Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Phoebe Putney, 133 S. Ct. 1003, 1012 (2013).
95Id. at 1013.
96 Id. at 1012-13.
SN.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 2015 WL 773331 (Feb. 25,
2015).
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duty to "actively supervise" anticompetitive conduct fostered by state regula-
tory bodies. A six-Justice majority (per Justice Kennedy) held that a state regu-
latory board that is controlled by market participants in the industry being
regulated cannot invoke "state action" antitrust immunity unless it is "actively
supervised" by the state. In so ruling, the Court struck a significant blow
against protectionist rent-seeking and for economic liberty. It also reduced
antitrust's error costs by making it more difficult for competitors to collude
under the guise of state action.
A North Carolina law subjects the licensing of dentistry to a state Board of
Dental Examiners (Board), six of whose eight members must be licensed den-
tists. After dentists complained to the Board that non-dentists were charging
lower prices than dentists for teeth whitening, the Board sent a cease-and-desist
letter to non-dentist teeth whitening providers, warning that the unlicensed
practice of dentistry is a crime. This led non-dentists to cease teeth whitening
services in North Carolina. The FTC concluded that the Board's actions vio-
lated section 5 of the FTC Act,99 which prohibits unfair methods of competition
(including actions that would violate sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act). 100
The Fourth Circuit agreed. 10 1
Affirming the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court rejected the claim that
state action immunity applied to the Board's actions. 102 The Court stressed
that, where a state delegates control over a market to a non-sovereign actor, im-
munity applies only if the state accepts political accountability by actively
supervising that actor's decisions. 103 The Court applied its Midcal test, which
permits immunity to attach only if the challenged anticompetitive conduct is
(1) clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as policy and (2) actively
supervised by the state. 104 The Court then held that entities designated as state
agencies are not exempt from active supervision when they are controlled by
market participants, because allowing an exemption in such circumstances
would pose the risk of self-dealing that the second prong of Midcal was created
to address.10 5
9 Id. at 1110.
SIn reN.C. Bd. ofDental Examiners, 152 F.T.C. 640, 2011 WL 11798463 (Dec. 2, 2011).
100 15 U.S.C. 5 45(a)(1) ("unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce... are hereby
declared unlawful"). The Supreme Court has held that section 5's prohibition on unfair methods
of competition extends beyond that of the Sherman Act. See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Sperry &
Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239 (1972). Nevertheless, in its North Carolina Dental holding,
the FTC stated that it "follow[ed] the standards of [Sherman Act] Section 1 to assess whether the
challenged actions of the Board violate[d] Section 5." Memorandum Opinion and Order, In the
Matter of the North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners, Dkt. No. 9343, at 10 (2011),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/12/111207ncdentalopinion.pdf.
101 N.C. Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 717 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2013).
102 North Carolina Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1110.
103 Id. at 1111.
104 See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
105 Id. at 1114.
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The Board's claim that its members were "invested ... with the power of the
[s]tate" was unavailing. 106 The Court reasoned that any exercise of sovereign
power entitled to state action immunity "requires more than a mere facade of
state involvement, for it is necessary ... to ensure the [s]tates accept political
accountability for anticompetitive conduct they permit and control."1 0 7 Here,
such accountability was lacking. The Board did not contend that the state
engaged in any-let alone any active-supervision of the Board's activities
affecting competition.10s The Court closed by summarizing "a few constant
requirements of active supervision," namely, (1) the supervisor must review
the substance of the anticompetitive decision, (2) the supervisor must have the
power to veto or modify particular decisions for consistency with state policy,
(3) "the mere potential for state supervision is not an adequate substitute for a
decision by the State," and (4) "the state supervisor may not itself be an active
market participant." 109 The Court cautioned, however, that "the adequacy of
supervision otherwise will depend on all the circumstances of a case." 110
Like Phoebe Putney, the Court's holding in North Carolina Dental helpfully
limits the scope of the Court's Parker v. Brown decision (which shielded from
federal antitrust attack a California raisin producers' cartel overseen by a state
board), 1 without excessively interfering in sovereign state prerogatives. State leg-
islatures may still choose to create self-interested professional regulatory bodies-
their sovereignty is not compromised. Now, however, they will need to (1) make
it clearer upfront that they intend to allow those bodies to displace competition,
and (2) subject those bodies to disinterested third party review. Such changes un-
doubtedly will entail some relatively modest administrative costs, given the sort of
guidance the Court has provided. Nevertheless, the administrative costs are likely
dwarfed by the benefits flowing from the new regulatory transparency. That trans-
parency should make it far easier for competition advocates (including competi-
tion agencies) to spot and publicize welfare-inimical regulatory schemes, and
weaken the incentive and ability of rent-seekers to undermine competition
through state regulatory processes. Such harmful schemes-particularly excessive
occupational licensing restraints-are legion, and they impose enormous costs on
the economy and price many consumers out of the market. 112 When they are put
into place, there is very little doubt that they restrain competition. All told, any
burdens the new judicially-imposed constraints will impose on regulating states
should be far outweighed by the substantial welfare benefits such constraints are
likely to generate.
106 Id. at 1110.
107 Id. at 1111.
10s Id. at 1116.
'o9 Id. at 1116-17.
110 Id. at 1117.
111 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
112 See Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face
Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REv. 1093, 1111-1116 (2014).
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North Carolina Dental thus squarely aligns with a "limits of antitrust" ap-
proach to state action. Implementation of the decision's guidance will entail
minimal Type I error (false convictions) while substantially reducing Type II
error (the prior failure to prosecute blatantly anticompetitive regulatory board
decisions because of doctrinal uncertainty), yielding large net gains in con-
sumer welfare. In particular, the absence of oversight by disinterested govern-
mental appointees will become a quick screen that allows potential antitrust
prosecutions to proceed. Although some decision costs may be generated in
deciding whether particular new state rules pass active supervision muster,
those costs would appear minor compared to the benefits from reducing Type
II errors.
D. Summation
As of this writing, each of the Roberts Court's antitrust decisions addressing ver-
tical restraints, exclusionary conduct, and antitrust enforcement is consistent
with Easterbrook's overarching policy prescription. We turn now to consider the
degree to which the federal antitrust enforcement agencies have followed the
Supreme Court's lead and embraced a limits of antitrust approach.
IV. THE ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES' INSENSITIVITY TO ANTITRUST'S
LIMITS
Compared to the Roberts Court, the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ)-at least in recent years-have displayed far less
concern for antitrust's inherent limits. We consider here four areas in which the
agencies seem to have departed from Easterbrook's sensible approach: exclusion-
ary conduct, vertical restraints, intellectual property rights, and merger policy.
A. Exclusionary Conduct
The agencies' insensitivity to the limits of antitrust is perhaps most evident in
their rejection of enforcement guidelines on challenges to unilateral exclusion-
ary conduct. As explained above, the monopolization and attempted monopol-
ization prohibitions in section 2 of the Sherman Act are remarkably vague.
The Supreme Court has held that each violation requires some degree of
market power and some instance of unreasonably exclusionary conduct,1 14 but
the line separating such conduct from vigorous but acceptable competition is
blurry indeed. Accordingly, the FTC and DOJ's Antitrust Division set out in
113 See supra text following note 14. See generally Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization
Standards, 56 STAN. L. REv. 253, 255 (2003) (observing that existing judicial definitions of
exclusionary conduct are "not just vague but vacuous").
114 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND
ITS PRACTICE 292 (4th ed. 2011).
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2006 to provide some guidance to the legal and business community about
how the agencies would enforce section 2's unilateral conduct provisions.
In formulating the Section 2 Report, the FTC and DOJ held an extensive,
year-long series of joint hearings consisting of 29 panels featuring 119 wit-
nesses. 116 Some of the hearings considered broad issues, such as how to
measure market power and fashion antitrust remedies. Most, however, were
focused on particular business practices that have sometimes been held to
violate section 2. Participants in the hearings set forth the theoretical anticom-
petitive harms and procompetitive benefits of the practices under consider-
ation, summarized the existing empirical evidence on the incidence of various
competitive effects, and made recommendations about which substantive li-
ability standards would maximize the net benefits of antitrust intervention.
The final Section 2 Report, released in September 2008 and consisting of
more than 200 pages, set forth principles to guide agency enforcement deci-
sions in cases involving predatory pricing and bidding, 1 1 7 exclusive dealing,l1S
tying,1 1 9 single-product and bundled loyalty discounts, 12 0 and unilateral refu-
sals to deal. 12 1 The Report also addressed potentially exclusionary conduct
not falling into one of the aforementioned categories and thus not subject to a
conduct-specific liability test. 122 Such conduct, the Report concluded, should
be deemed unlawful under section 2 only if its anticompetitive effects were
shown to be substantially disproportionate to any associated procompetitive
effects. 123
The Section 2 Report was very much attuned to the limits of antitrust. For
each of the particular practices addressed, the Report assessed why it is a com-
petitive mixed bag-that is, how it could occasion anticompetitive harm but
might also create procompetitive benefits. The Report then set forth liability
rules designed to be both administrable and capable of condemning most
anticompetitive instances of a practice while screening out those that are likely
to create net benefits. Evident throughout the Report-perhaps most notably
115 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC and DOJ to Host Joint Public Hearings on Single-
firm Conduct as Related to Competition (Nov. 28, 2005), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
press-releases/2005/11/ftc-and-doj-host-joint-public-hearings-single-firm-conduct. Section 2
also prohibits some concerted conduct, conspiracy to monopolize. 15 U.S.C. 5 2. The
agencies' guidelines project did not address such conduct and instead focused only on
unilateral (single-firm) offenses.
116 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT
UNDER Section 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 1 (2008) [hereinafter Single-Firm Conduct Report].
Four of the panels were held outside Washington, D.C. (in Chicago and Berkeley, California)
and involved witnesses from the business community. Id.
117 Id. at 49-76.
11s Id. at 131-42.
119 Id. at 77-90.
120 Id. at 91-118.
121 Id. at 119-30.
122 Id. at 33-46.
123 Id. at 45-46.
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in the requirement that conduct not falling into one of the specific categories
"disproportionately" impair consumer welfare before being condemned-
were concerns about over-deterring output-enhancing behavior and a belief
that market power is self-destructive (such that over-deterrence, or Type I
error, is of greater concern than under-deterrence, or Type II error). Thus, the
Report, like Easterbrook's famous article, acknowledged the inevitability of
errors in section 2 enforcement and adjudication, highlighted the need to min-
imize error costs, emphasized administrable rules and screening devices, and
recognized that over-deterrence is generally more harmful than under-deter-
rence in the antitrust context.
In the end, the enforcement agencies abandoned the Section 2 guidelines.
The FTC never even signed on to the final Report. 124 According to a majority
of the Commissioners, the Report was deficient because it endorsed a limits of
antitrust approach. The majority downplayed the risk of error, 125 rejected the
view that over-deterrence is of greater concern in this context than under-
deterrence, 126 questioned the degree to which market power tends to be self-
correcting, 127 and discounted the value of administrable rules and screening
devices. 128 In short, the Commission eschewed an enforcement policy pre-
mised on Easterbrook's ideas. The September 2008 Report thus reflected the
enforcement policies of only the DOJ.
Even that effect was short-lived. In May 2009, Assistant Attorney General
Christine Varney, delivering her first public remarks after President Obama
appointed her as the head of the DOJ's Antitrust Division, announced that the
124 See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONERS HARBOUR, LEIBOWITZ,
AND ROSCH ON THE ISSUANCE OF THE Section 2 REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1
(Sept. 2008) ("The Federal Trade Commission ('FTC') does not endorse the Department's
Report.").
125 Id. at 3 ("The Report notes that it is often difficult to distinguish between aggressive
competition and exclusionary conduct. ... We believe that the federal antitrust enforcement
agencies and the private antitrust bar are (and will remain) up to that task, in the section 2
realm and elsewhere.").
126 Id. at 3-4 (observing that "the Report downplays the risk of under-enforcement" and asserting
that the view that over-deterrence is of greater concern than under-deterrence "does not
adequately consider the harm consumers will suffer while waiting for the correction to
occur").
127 Id. at 4 ("Markets can and do take years, even decades, to correct themselves. For one reason
or another, it may take a long time for rivals to surmount entry barriers or other impediments
to effective competition.").
128 See id. (asserting that "[w]hile clear rules are desirable in the abstract, the benefits of clarity
must be balanced against the benefits of effective and reasonable law enforcement, lest the
interests of consumers be compromised" and contending that "the Report overstates the
extent to which the Supreme Court has embraced bright-line rules of per se legality"); see also
id. (" [N] o one-including the Department has yet provided a methodology for weighing the
costs and benefits of Section 2 enforcement (including potential remedies), or for comparing
the relative costs and benefits to businesses versus consumers. Therefore, we do not agree that
any category of conduct can be excluded from the scope of Section 2 based on the difficulty of
devising an appropriate remedy.").
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DOJ would no longer adhere to the principles set forth in the Section 2 Report.12 9
Like the FTC majority, Varney downplayed the risk of over-deterrence and
expressed confidence in antitrust enforcers' ability to distinguish between good
and bad instances of mixed-bag unilateral practices:
The Report sounds a call of great skepticism regarding the ability of antitrust enforcers-as
well as antitrust courts-to distinguish between anticompetitive acts and lawful conduct,
and raises the related concern that the failure to make proper distinctions may lead to "over-
deterrence" with regard to potentially procompetitive conduct. I do not share these con-
cerns. I strongly believe that antitrust enforcers are able to separate the wheat from the chaff
in identifying exclusionary and predatory acts.13 0
Varney further asserted that " [t]he Report ... goes too far in evaluating the im-
portance of preserving possible efficiencies and understates the importance of
redressing exclusionary and predatory acts that result in harm to competition,
distort markets, and increase barriers to entry." 131 The disproportionality test,
she maintained, "reflects an excessive concern with the risks of over-deterrence
and a resulting preference for an overly lenient approach to enforcement." 132
In expressing equal concern for the risks of over- and under-deterrence,
Varney implicitly rejected Easterbrook's position.133
Both enforcement agencies, then, have refused to recognize the limits of
their ability to enhance consumer welfare by pursuing unilateral business
129 Christine A. Varney, Assistant Attorney General, Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in This
Challenging Era, Remarks Before the Center for American Progress (May 11, 2009), http://
www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/245711 .pdf.
130 Id. at 6.
131 Id. at 7.
132 Id. at 8.
133 See Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 2-3 (contending that false convictions create greater social
loss than false acquittals). Varney's lack of concern about over-deterrence should have come as
no surprise. Prior to her confirmation, she made public remarks suggesting that she believed
over-deterrence was not a problem in the antitrust context. In a presentation in which she
endorsed a number of enforcement ideas from the reliably interventionist American Antitrust
Institute, Varney stated:
... I was prepared to say there is no such thing as a false positive; you know, let's get real. I
have counseled numerous incumbents who are dominant as well as numerous new
entrants. I can tell you, at least in my own experience, there is not a dominant incumbent
who hasn't done something that is lawful because they were afraid that it might be
reviewed by the DOJ or a state attorney general or an FTC. I just don't see it. Ten years
back in the private sector I have never once seen it. So I think that this ruse of, you know,
we have to be restrained in our enforcement because false positives will chill innovation,
take an economic toll on society and overall result in negative economic consequence,
slowing output, increasing cost, I just think is false. I think the more people in the bars start
rejecting this idea of false positives the better off we're going to be.
See Josh Wright, DOJAAG Designate Christine Varney on Section 2, Europe, Google & a Puzzling
Statement About Error Costs, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Feb. 22, 2009), http://truthonthemarket.
com/2009/02/22/doj-aag-designate-christine-varney-on-section-2-europe-google-a-puzzling-
statement-about-error-costs/.
The Roberts Court Versus the Enforcement Agencies 819
conduct that has some tendency to exclude rivals. Given that much
welfare-enhancing single-firm conduct has an incidental exclusionary effect,
the agencies' hubris will likely injure consumers in the long run.134
B. Vertical Restraints
While the Roberts Court's two vertical restraints decisions, Leegin and
Independent Ink, modified antitrust doctrine in a manner that would reduce the
sum of error and decision costs,135 several recent agency actions in vertical re-
straint cases reveal an insensitivity to the limits of antitrust and are likely to
enhance the error costs associated with regulation of both intrabrand and inter-
brand vertical restraints.
1. Vertical Intrabrand Restraints (RPM)
In 2000, the FTC sued women's shoe manufacturer Nine West for violating
the then-prevailing per se rule against minimum resale price maintenance
136(RPM)1. The lawsuit resulted in a consent order in which Nine West agreed
to refrain from a number of business practices that could dissuade its dealers
from offering discounts on its products. 137 After the Leegin Court abrogated
the per se rule against minimum RPM, Nine West petitioned the FTC for a
modification of the consent order.138 Although the Commission ultimately
agreed to modify the order, its response suggested that it intends to subject
RPM to an unwarranted level of scrutiny, one that will produce significant
Type I (false conviction) error costs.
The Commission stated that it would evaluate RPM under a version of the
truncated analysis it adopted in Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, which held that
an "inherently suspect" restraint of trade will be presumed unreasonable
134 For example, in a case discussed in more detail below (see infra notes 157-166 and
accompanying text), the FTC accused Intel Corp. of violating section 2 by offering above-cost
loyalty rebates that likely would have passed muster under the guidelines in the Section 2
Report. See Single-Firm Conduct Report, supra note 115, at 116-17 (positing liberal liability
standard for above-cost loyalty rebates). As explained below, Intel settled the FTC action by
entering a consent decree in which it agreed not to offer loyalty discounts which are
ultimately price cuts likely to be passed on to end-user consumers-in the future. Surely many
of Intel's now-forbidden discounts would have been procompetitive. Moreover, because of the
FTC action and subsequent settlement, similarly situated firms are likely to forego their own
loyalty discounts; they certainly have a fair response when purchasers of their products press
for such price cuts.
135 See supra notes 26-47 and accompanying text.
136 See Complaint, In re Nine West Group, Inc., F.T.C Dkt. No. C-3937 (Apr. 11, 2000), http://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2000/04/ninewestcmp.htm.
137 See Decision and Order, In re Nine West Group, Inc., F.T.C Dkt. No. C-3937 (Apr. 11,
2000), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2000/04/ninewest.do_.htm.
138 See Petition to Reopen and Modify Order, In re Nine West Group, Inc., F.T.C Dkt. No. C-3937
(Oct. 30, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2007/11/071106petition.
pdf.
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unless the defendant "either identif[ies] some reason the restraint is unlikely to
harm consumers or identif[ies] some competitive benefit that plausibly offsets
the apparent or anticipated harm." 139 A group of states had asked the
Commission to declare all instances of RPM to be inherently suspect since the
practice usually raises consumer prices. 140 The Commission wisely rejected
that position in recognition of the fact that higher consumer prices are the very
mechanism by which RPM may generate dealer services that enhance output
and benefit consumers. 141 But it still endorsed a fairly inhospitable liability
rule. Under the approach the Commission adopted, a defendant manufacturer
may avoid the conclusion that its RPM is inherently suspect only if it proves:
(1) that the manufacturers using RPM do not comprise a significant portion of
the relevant market; (2) that the manufacturer, not its dealers, initiated the
RPM; and (3) that there is no dominant manufacturer or dealer with market
power. 142 If the defendant fails to make such a showing, its RPM will be pre-
sumed unreasonable and will be illegal unless the defendant proves that the
RPM enhanced its total sales relative to what they would have been absent the
pricing policy. 143
This liability rule tilts heavily against defendant manufacturers, who must
sustain a heavy proof burden to avoid treble damages in RPM cases. First, a
defendant faces the difficult task of establishing the relevant manufacturer
market1 44 and producing data on the use of RPM by other manufacturers in
that market and their market shares. The defendant then has to prove that it,
not its dealers, initiated the RPM. That showing would be difficult to make if
there were any evidence that high-service dealers had complained about their
low-service, presumably cheaper, rivals. Such dealer complaints may simply
have alerted the manufacturer of the need to induce higher dealer quality by
reducing price competition,145 but they could easily be taken to suggest that
139 Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
140 See Amended States' Comments Urging Denial of Nine West's Petition 8, In re Nine West
Group, Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. No. C-3937 (Jan. 17, 2008), http://www.ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/
pdfs/bureaus/antitrust/AmendedStatecomments_01 1708-9west.pdf.
141 See Order Granting in Part Petition to Reopen and Modify Order Issued April 11, 2000, In re
Nine West Group, Inc., F.T.C Dkt. No. C-3937, at 13 (May 6, 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/05/080506order.pdf.
142 Id. at 13-15.
143 Id. at 15-16.
144 In its consideration of Nine West's petition for modification, for example, the FTC required
Nine West to expend significant effort demonstrating the contours of the market in which it
participates. See Letter from Ronald S. Rolfe, Esq., Cravath, Swaine & Moore, LLP to Eric
D. Rohlck, Federal Trade Commission, In re Nine West Group, Inc., F.T.C Dkt. No. C-3937
(Mar. 26, 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/03/080326nine
westadditionalinfoltr.pdf.
145 See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1984) (observing that
manufacturers who respond to dealer complaints about price-cutting dealers may be
motivated by a concern to preserve or enhance dealer services, not by a desire to assist
complaining dealers).
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dealers, not the manufacturer, initiated the restraint. Finally, a defendant
manufacturer must establish its own lack of market power and the absence of
market power on the part of each of its dealers. The latter showing requires the
defendant to define a second (dealer) market. If the defendant fails to make
any of these showings, it can avoid liability only by proving that its RPM
increased its overall output. To do that, it must engage in sophisticated statis-
tical analysis to isolate the effects of RPM from other factors that could affect
overall output.
In short, the FTC's evaluative approach requires any manufacturer adopting
an RPM policy to be prepared to make a difficult showing to avoid treble
damages liability. As a consequence, the approach discourages RPM arrange-
ments despite the fact that both theoretical considerations and empirical evi-
dence suggest that they are more likely to enhance than to reduce overall market
output. 146 The Commission's approach is sure to produce greater error costs
than would a liability rule requiring plaintiffs in RPM cases to produce evidence
of either an actual reduction in market output or the prerequisites to one of the
well recognized theories of RPM-induced anticompetitive harm.
2. Vertical Interbrand Restraints
Exclusive dealing and loyalty discounts are related practices. In an exclusive
dealing arrangement, the seller, often a manufacturer, conditions the sale of its
product on an agreement by the buyer, often a retailer, to purchase all its
requirements from that seller.14 7 With loyalty discounts, the seller does not
require exclusivity or near exclusivity but instead gives a discount (or rebate) on
all the buyer's purchases of a product if the buyer purchases from the seller
some predetermined amount, often a percentage of the buyer's requirements. 148
Exclusive dealing and loyalty discounts are vertical interbrand restraints because
they have the effect of restraining the downstream party, the buyer, from trading
in brands competing with those of the upstream party, the seller.
Both practices may occasion anticompetitive harms or procompetitive bene-
fits. On the harm side, contracts that mandate or encourage exclusivity may
reduce overall market output if they have the effect of foreclosing a producer's
rivals from so many sales opportunities that the rivals are forced to reduce their
output below minimum efficient scale.14 9 A dominant firm that prevents its
rivals from attaining economies of scale and thereby raises their per-unit costs
146 See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
147 See Single-Firm Conduct Report, supra note 115, at 131. When a restaurant franchisee agrees
to buy all its ingredients from a franchisor, for example, the parties have engaged in exclusive
dealing.
148 Id. at 106. For example, a producer of surgical sutures might give a 20 percent discount on all
sutures sold to a particular hospital if the hospital buys at least 70 percent of its sutures from
the producer.
149 See Joshua D. Wright, Moving Beyond Narve Foreclosure Analysis, 19 GEO. MASON L. REv.
1163, 1166-67 (2012).
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will be less constrained by price competition and may be able to charge more
for its products. For such anticompetitive harm to result, though, at least three
circumstances must exist. First, the degree of foreclosure caused by the perpe-
trator's exclusive dealing must be substantial enough to drive (or hold) at least
some rivals below minimum efficient scale;150 foreclosing, say, one percent of
sales opportunities likely would not raise rivals' costs. Second, it must be im-
practicable for foreclosed rivals to bypass the buyers subject to the exclusive
dealing arrangements and sell to others by, for example, integrating forward
into distribution or selling through newly entering distributors. Finally,
output-reducing exclusive dealing is unlikely absent significant barriers to
entry in the producer market. If market power created by foreclosure-inducing
exclusive dealing could be easily undermined by new firms entering the produ-
cer market in response to supracompetitive prices, producers-who generally
have to "pay" something to induce exclusivity-would be unlikely to attempt
monopolization via exclusive dealing, and even if they did so, consumer harm
would be unlikely.
On the benefit side, vertical arrangements mandating or encouraging exclu-
sivity may (1) encourage producers to invest in downstream buyers' (for
example, retailers') operations by preventing "interbrand free-riding" by com-
peting producers,15 1 (2) reduce consumer prices by intensifying competition
among producers for distribution, 152 (3) enhance consumer welfare by redu-
cing the costs associated with uncertain supply and demand, 153 and (4)
150 Id. at 1166 ("A consensus has emerged that a necessary condition for anticompetitive harm
arising from allegedly exclusionary agreements is that the contracts foreclose rivals from a
share of distribution sufficient to achieve [MES].").
151 A manufacturer of gasoline, for example, may try to increase its sales by providing the
independent retailers that carry its brand with attractive signage, good lighting, and free items
for customers (for example, roadmaps). If such a retailer were also to carry gasoline produced
by another manufacturer that did not provide similar retailer investments (and thus bore less
cost, permitting it to charge lower wholesale prices), many of the additional sales resulting
from the amenities provided by the investing producer would flow to its non-investing, lower-
cost rival. By assuring investing producers that their retailer investments will not inure to the
benefit of their rivals, exclusive dealing may encourage producers to make consumer-friendly,
output-enhancing investments in the distributors that carry their brands. See generally Howard
P. Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 6-11 (1982).
152 To induce retailer exclusivity and the heightened sales that it will generate, producers often
lower their wholesale prices in exchange for exclusive dealing. Competition among retailers for
customers thus ensures that those wholesale price-savings are passed on to consumers in the
form of lower retail prices. Those lower retail prices, in turn, more than make up for any
welfare loss occasioned by reduced consumer choice. By intensifying the competition for
access to a retailer, exclusive dealing may therefore confer a net benefit on consumers. See
generally Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Exclusive Dealing Intensifies Competition for
Distribution, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 433 (2008).
153 Distributors may find exclusive dealing contracts to be the optimal way to assure a steady
source of supply. A gasoline retailer, for example, will want to ensure adequate gasoline
supplies for the busy summer months. It could contract in advance to purchase some fixed
quantity of gasoline from a producer, but it would run the risk that consumer demand may
either soften, leaving it with a glut of gasoline, or spike, leaving it without sufficient gasoline
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encourage the production of multicomponent systems by protecting producers
of complete systems from adverse "cherry picking" by producers of popular,
high-margin individual components. 154 Given that exclusive dealing has these
many procompetitive uses and is likely to cause anticompetitive harm in only a
narrow set of circumstances, it should come as no surprise that empirical
studies find most instances of exclusive dealing to enhance, rather than
reduce, competition.155
Because exclusive dealing and related arrangements like loyalty discounts
are usually procompetitive, a showing of harm to competition-an actual or
likely reduction in overall market output, not simply harm to an individual
competitor-should be a prerequisite to antitrust liability. Supreme Court pre-
cedent requires as much, 156 and some older FTC decisions have honored the
and forcing it to find other suppliers. The retailer's lowest-cost option for assuring an
adequate, but not excessive, supply of gasoline may well be to enter a requirements contract
under which it promises to buy all its requirements from a single gasoline producer in
exchange for that producer's promise to supply all that is required. On the producer side,
exclusive dealing may reduce uncertainty and thereby decrease costs (and ultimately prices) by
assuring producers of a steady source of demand for their output. By making it easier for
producers to forecast demand for their products, exclusive dealing reduces the risk associated
with, and thus encourages, investments in productive facilities. See Hovenkamp, supra note 18,
at 439.
154 Products like plumbing systems often utilize multiple parts (pipes, valves, etc.) that are similar
in design, have comparable fixed costs of production, and are used together but not in fixed
proportions. Consumers benefit from having ready access to full lines of such component
parts. Full-line forcing, a type of exclusive dealing, may prevent adverse "cherry-picking" that
discourages full-line production. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
155 See Jan B. Heide, Shantanu Dutta & Mark Bergen, Exclusive Dealing and Business Efficiency:
Evidence from Industry Practice, 41 J.L. & EcoN. 387, 387 (1998) (finding that "firms are more
likely to use exclusive dealing when there is a potential that other manufacturers can free ride
on the services they provide" and that "when manufacturers are concerned about the costs that
exclusive dealing imposes on end customers, such arrangements are less likely"); Tim R. Sass,
The Competitive Effects of Exclusive Dealing: Evidence from the U.S. Beer Industry, 23 INT'L J.
INDUS. ORG. 203 (2005) (concluding that exclusive dealing in the beer market increases
market output); James C. Cooper, Luke Froeb, Daniel P. O'Brien & Michael Vita, Vertical
Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference, 23 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 639, 658 (2005) (observing
that although "some studies find evidence consistent with both pro and anticompetitive effects
... virtually no studies claim to have identified instances where vertical practices were likely to
have harmed competition"); Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Exclusive Contracts and
Vertical Restraints: Empirical Evidence and Public Policy in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST
EcoNoMICs 391 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2008) ("[I]t appears that when manufacturers choose
to impose restraints, not only do they make themselves better off but they also typically allow
consumers to benefit from higher quality products and better service provision."); Daniel
O'Brien, The Antitrust Treatment of Vertical Restraints: Beyond the Possibility Theorems in THE
PROS AND CONS OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 40, 72-73 (2008) (observing that "with few
exceptions, the literature does not support the view that [vertical restraints] are used for
anticompetitive reasons").
156 See, e.g., Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 329 (1961) (requiring
showing of harm to competition).
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"harm to competition" requirement in exclusive dealing cases. In several
recent FTC actions, however, the Commission has paid only lip service to the
requirement, ignoring actual market evidence suggesting an absence of com-
petitive harm from challenged arrangements and allowing mere harm to a
competitor to suffice as a basis for imposing liability.
a. Intel
In late 2009, the FTC sued Intel Corp., claiming that the company's loyalty
rebates on microprocessor and graphics processor units ("CPUs" and "GPUs")
violated section 2 of the Sherman Act and constituted an "unfair method of com-
petition" in violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.1 58 Intel
had paid significant rebates to computer producers (original equipment manu-
facturers or "OEMs") that purchased high percentages of their CPU and GPU
requirements from Intel. Intel's chief rival, Advanced Micro Devices ("AMD"),
had brought and settled a complaint alleging that Intel's loyalty rebates had the
effect of foreclosing AMD from so many sales opportunities that it was driven
below minimum efficient scale.15 9 The FTC's complaint mirrored AMD's
action and added some theories involving graphics chips. In October 2010, Intel
settled the FTC action, entering a consent decree in which it agreed, among
other things, not to offer any loyalty discounts or rebates on its chipsets. 160
The problem with the FTC action and subsequent consent decree is that
actual market evidence suggested an absence of harm to competition from
Intel's loyalty rebates, which were ultimately price cuts that OEMs, in compet-
ing with each other, passed along to consumers. Intel's loyalty discounts began
in 1999, which implied that, by the time the FTC filed its complaint, there was
no need to speculate on their competitive effect. As then-Professor (now FTC
Commissioner) Joshua Wright observed, the FTC's theory that Intel's loyalty
rebates harmed competition by driving AMD below minimum efficient scale
"ha[d] several testable implications." 16 1 If the discounts indeed constituted
anticompetitive harm, rather than simply vigorous competition that may have
157 See, e.g., In re Beltone Electronics, 100 F.T.C. 68, 204 (1982).
15 Complaint, In re Intel Corp., F.T.C. Dkt. No. 9341 (Dec. 16, 2009), http:/www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/cases/091216intelcmpt.pdf. As observed above, Section 5's prohibition
of unfair methods of competition extends beyond the scope of Sherman Act prohibitions. See
supra note 99.
159 See Settlement Agreement Between Advanced Micro Devices Inc. and Intel Corporation (Nov.
11, 2009), http://download.intel.com/pressroom/legalAMD-settlement-agreement.pdf.
160 See Decision and Order, In re Intel Corp., F.T.C Dkt. No. 9341 (Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.
ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/101 102inteldo.pdf (stating that Intel shall not, for a
ten-year period, "condition[] any Benefit to a Customer based on the Market Segment Share
of a Relevant Product or a Computer Product Chipset that a Customer awards to [Intel] or to
any competitor").
161 Joshua D. Wright, An Antitrust Analysis of the Federal Trade Commission's Complaint Against Intel
6, ICLE Antitrust and Competition Policy White Paper (June 8, 2010), http://www.academia.
edu/2821047/AnAntitrustAnalysis-oftheFederalTradeCommission-sComplaint
Against Intel.
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made life harder for AMD but ultimately enhanced output, then one would
expect that:
* Intel's market share would have increased and AMD's decreased since
1999;
* Intel's share price would have increased and AMD's decreased following
implementation of the rebates; and
* AMD would have avoided significant investments in future capacity,
given that the company would face difficulty recouping its investment
expenditures once it was excluded from the marketplace. 162
In fact, the evidence showed something very different. The market shares of
Intel and AMD remained fairly constant from 1999 to 2009; there was no
obvious reduction in AMD's market share after Intel commenced its discount-
ing. 163 Moreover, stock price data from the relevant time period appear incon-
sistent with the theory that Intel was anticompetitively raising AMD's costs to
earn supracompetitive profits. The stock prices of the two companies generally
moved in tandem, suggesting that price variation over time was due to the two
competitors' facing similar economic circumstances.164 Finally, AMD's sub-
stantial capacity expansion and investments in research and development fol-
lowing implementation of Intel's loyalty discounts suggested that AMD itself
did not believe that it was being driven below minimum efficient scale. Why
would it invest billions of dollars upfront absent an expectation of future
returns? 165
162 Id. at 7.
163 Id. at 7-8.
164 Id. at 9-13. The performance of AMD's stock did degrade relative to Intel's after 2006, but the
Commission's theory would have predicted such degradation at an earlier time, and AMD's
stock travails were more plausibly explained by adverse business developments: in 2007, AMD
suffered botched releases of its Barcelona and ATI products, as well as discovering a design
flaw in its Barcelona "quad-core" product. Given that AMD's adverse stock performance
occurred just as it had gained Toshiba as a customer and was thus able to expand distribution,
it seems more likely that AMD's own product difficulties-not distribution restrictions
occasioned by Intel's discounting were to blame for AMD's poor post-2006 performance.
See id. 11-12 & n.36 (citing AMD Hit By Losses Across All Divisions, MSN MONEYCENTRAL
(Dec. 12, 2007), http://news.moneycentral.msn.com/provider/providerarticle.aspx?feed=FT&
date=20071213&id=7941190).
165 As Wright explained, "AMD's substantial investments into research and development and
expanded capacity during the relevant time frame" undermine the FTC's theory that Intel's
loyalty rebates were anticompetitively raising AMD's costs by foreclosing enough sales
opportunities to drive it below minimum efficient scale:
For example, in October 2005, AMD announced the opening of Fab 36 in Dresden,
Germany, and expected to invest a total of $2.5 billion in this facility by November 2007.
It has also been reported that AMD has made substantial investments into converting its
existing Fab 30 from the 130-nm process to the 90-nm process. The evidence appears to
support the view that AMD is able to sell all of the chips that it is able to produce and
AMD's capacity, not Intel's conduct, constrained AMD. If AMD is successfully selling
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Of course, the most important testable implication of the FTC's theory of
anticompetitive harm was that Intel's loyalty discounts would result in market
output being lower than it otherwise would have been. Again, the evidence
suggested something different. In the ten years in which Intel engaged in al-
legedly exclusionary conduct, microprocessor prices fell at an average rate of
40 percent annually.1 6 6 Indeed, quality-adjusted prices of computer micropro-
cessors declined more rapidly during the relevant period than did the prices of
products in all 1,200 other product categories monitored by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. 167
None of this proves, of course, that Intel's loyalty discounts enhanced
market output from what it otherwise would have been. It could well be that,
absent Intel's discounts, (1) AMD's market share would have increased rela-
tive to Intel's; (2) AMD's stock performance would have exceeded, rather than
mirrored, that of Intel; (3) AMD's investments in capacity expansion and re-
search and development would have been even greater than they were; and (4)
computer processor prices would have fallen even faster than they did. But in
light of the fact that exclusivity-inducing vertical arrangements are usually pro-
competitive-and that these particular arrangements resulted in an immediate
consumer benefit, lower prices-Intel should not have borne the burden of dis-
proving the Commission's theory of harm. By extracting a discount-chilling
settlement from Intel based on a practice that had long been in existence and
yet had produced no apparent harm to competition, the Commission likely
created significant Type I error costs.
b. McWane
The FTC's recent decision in In re McWanel 68 similarly condemned an exclu-
sive dealing arrangement on the basis of a theoretical anticompetitive harm,
even though the arrangement had been in place for long enough to generate an
anticompetitive effect without apparently having done so. The complaint
counsel claimed that defendant McWane, the dominant producer of domestic
iron pipe fittings, had monopolized the market by instituting a "full support
policy" under which it would sell its products only to distributors that carried
all the chips it can produce, and capacity constraints unrelated to Intel's conduct are the
binding constraint on AMD's production, such evidence would be inconsistent with the
Commission's theory. Moreover, if AMD believed that Intel's conduct was leading
inexorably to AMD's demise it would be unlikely to make such substantial up-front
investments with the expectation of future returns.
Wright, supra note 160, at 13-14.
166 Id. at 14.
167 Id. (citing U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Producer Price Index, series identification numbers
PCU33441333441312 (Microprocessors), http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/dsrv?pc (Mar. 7, 2010)).
168 Opinion of the Commission, In re McWane, Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. No. 9351 (Jan. 30, 2014), http://
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140206mcwaneopinion_0.pdf.
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its fittings exclusively. 169 The policy was subject to two exceptions: where
McWane products were not available, and where a distributor purchased a
McWane rival's pipe in addition to its fittings. 170 The FTC concluded that the
policy caused anticompetitive harm by artificially holding McWane's rivals
below minimum efficient scale, thereby raising their costs and enhancing
McWane's ability to raise its own prices. It thus exercised its authority
under section 5 of the FTC Act to impose liability for monopolization. 172
There are many reasons to question the Commission's determination that
McWane had engaged in anticompetitive exclusionary conduct. First, the evi-
dence on what constituted minimum efficient scale in the relevant market was
remarkably thin, consisting entirely of testimony by rival Star Pipe Products,
Ltd. ("Star") that it would face lower average costs if it owned a foundry but
could not justify building one given its low market share. 1 7 3 Countering that
self-serving testimony were a couple of pieces of actual market evidence. First,
the second-largest domestic seller of pipe fittings, Sigma Corp., somehow
managed to enter the pipe fittings market and capture a 30-percent market
share (as opposed to Star's 20-percent), without owning any of its own pro-
duction facilities. Such success suggested that foundry ownership-and, thus,
a level of sales sufficient to support foundry construction-may not be neces-
sary for efficient scale in the domestic pipe fittings industry. 174 So did Star's
own success. Star entered the pipe fittings market in 2009, quickly grew to a
20-percent market share, and was on pace to continue growth when the
McWane action commenced in January 2012. 175 As Commissioner Wright
observed, "for [the Commission's] view of MES [that is, minimum efficient
scale] to make sense on the facts that exist in the record, Star would have to be
operating below MES, becoming less efficient over time as McWane's Full
Support Program further raised the costs of distribution, and yet remaining in
the market and growing its business. Such a position strains credulity." 176
In addition to failing to establish what constitutes minimum efficient scale
in the pipe fittings industry, the FTC never adequately established the degree
of foreclosure occasioned by McWane's full support program. First, the
Commission reasoned that all McWane sales to distributors subject to its full
support program had been "foreclosed," via exclusive dealing, to McWane's
competitors. That is incorrect. The sales opportunities foreclosed by McWane's
169 Id. at 1, 9-11.
170 Id. at 9.
171 Id. at 22-29.
172 Id. at 13.
173 See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright in Memorandum Opinion &
Order, In re McWane, Inc., F.T.C. File No. 9351, at 28-29 (Jan. 30, 2014), http:/www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/publicstatements/202211/140206mcwanestatement.pdf. [hereinafter
Wright Dissent].
174 Id. at 31-32.
175 Id. at 32.
176 Id.
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full support policy were only the "contestable" sales-that is, those that would
have been made to other sellers but for the policy. 1 7 7 Moreover, the Commission
made no effort to quantify the sales made to McWane's rivals under the two
exceptions to McWane's full support policy.1 7 8 Such sales were obviously not
foreclosed to McWane's rivals, but the Commission essentially ignored
them.1 7 9 Absent information on the number of contestable sales and the volume
of distributor purchases under exceptions to the full support program, it is
simply impossible to assess the degree of foreclosure occasioned by the policy.
Not only did the Commission disregard deficiencies in the affirmative case
against McWane, it also ignored several pieces of evidence suggesting that
McWane's exclusive dealing was not anticompetitive. First, the full support
program did not require a commitment of exclusivity for any period of time;
distributors purchasing from McWane could begin carrying rival brands at any
point (though doing so might cause McWane to refuse to sell to them in the
future).1so Courts have often held that short-duration exclusive dealing
arrangements are less troubling than longer-term agreements;1 81 indeed, a
number of courts presume the legality of exclusive dealing contracts of a year
or less.182 McWane's policy was of no, not just short, duration.
Second, entry considerations suggested an absence of anticompetitive harm
here. If entry into a market is easy, there is little need to worry that exclusionary
conduct will produce market power. Once the monopolist begins to exercise
its power by reducing output and raising price, new entrants will appear on the
scene, driving price and output back to competitive levels. The recent and suc-
cessful entry of both Star and Sigma, who collectively gained about half the
177 Id. at 38-40. For example, if a distributor, absent the full support policy, would have
purchased 70 units from McWane and 5 units from Star but, because of the full support
program, purchased all 75 units from McWane, the full support program effectively foreclosed
Star from 5 units of sales, not 75 units.
178 Id. at 40-41.
179 For example, if a distributor that carried McWane's products (and was thus subject to the full
support policy) purchased 70 domestic fittings from McWane and 30 fittings from other
producers pursuant to one of the full support program's exceptions, the Commission counted
100 units of foreclosed sales.
1so Wright Dissent, supra note 172, at 43.
'81 See, e.g., Omega Envtl., Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1997) (observing
that "the short duration and easy terminability of [certain exclusive] agreements negate
substantially their potential to foreclose competition"); W. Parcel Express v. United Parcel
Serv. of America, Inc., 190 F.3d 974, 976 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding that "termination
provisions that allowed a customer to terminate the contract for any reason with very little
notice" were relevant to upholding agreements).
182 See, e.g., Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1059 (8th Cir. 2000); U.S.
Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 596 (1st Cir. 1993); CDC Techs.,
Inc. v. IDEXX Lab., Inc., 186 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 1999); Thompson Everett, Inc. v. Nat'l Cable
Adver., 57 F.3d 1317, 1325 (4th Cir. 1995); Roland Machinery v. Dresser Industries, 749
F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984).
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total market share within a short period of time, suggested that entry into the
pipe fittings market is easy.183
Finally, evidence of actual market performance indicated that McWane's
exclusive dealing policies did not generate anticompetitive effect. McWane
enforced its full support program for the first year of Star's participation in the
domestic fittings market, but not thereafter. Star's growth rate, however, was
exactly the same during the enforcement of the policy as it was both before the
policy was implemented and after it ended.184 That suggests that the program
had no impact on rivals' ability to enter the market and grow their business, in
which case it could not be anticompetitive. 185
The Commission also virtually ignored a procompetitive justification for
McWane's full support policy. McWane produced a complete "system"-a full
line of domestic pipe fittings-comprised of disparate but complementary parts.
Both distributors and end-users have an interest in having ready access to all the
parts in such a system, and a vertical interbrand restraint like McWane's full
support policy may help ensure such access. Because McWane's fixed costs (for
example, the cost of casting a die) were similar for both rarely used fittings and
popular fittings, McWane's average production cost for a rarely used fitting [that
is, (fixed costs + variable costs) + number of units produced] was higher than its
average cost for an oft-used part. That meant that, if McWane charged similar
prices for technologically similar parts-a pricing practice purchasers often
expect-it needed to "subsidize" production of rarely-used fittings with margins
earned on popular parts. An equally efficient producer of only popular fittings
would not have to engage in such "cross-subsidization" to finance the produc-
tion of rarely used parts and would be able to sell its popular fittings at a lower
price. But if too many buyers purchased their often-used fittings from the partial
line producer, McWane could no longer afford to produce rarely used parts,
and gaps in product availability would result.186
183 Wright Dissent, supra note 172, at 44-45.
184 Id. at 45.
1s5 As Commissioner Wright explained,
Neither Complaint Counsel nor the Commission attempt [ed] to explain how growth that
is equal with and without the Full Support Program is consistent with [the Commission's]
theory of harm that the Program raised Star's costs of distribution and impaired
competition. The most plausible inference to draw from these particular facts is that the
Full Support Program had almost no impact on Star's ability to enter and grow its
business, which, under the case law, strongly counsels against holding that McWane's
conduct was exclusionary.
Id. at 45-46.
186 The Commission maintained that, if other producers started underselling McWane on
popular parts, McWane could reduce its price to meet theirs and then set a separate price for
low-volume parts, charging enough to cover the fixed costs of producing those parts. See
Opinion of the Commission, supra note 167, at 32. But McWane may have had good business
reasons to prefer a cross-subsidization strategy to such a separate pricing approach. First,
consumers may have been put off by having to pay substantially higher prices for
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McWane's Full Support Program offered a solution to this problem. By re-
quiring buyers of its fittings to refrain from handling those of other producers,
McWane could prevent the sort of "cherry-picking" that would have rendered
its production of obscure parts uneconomical. Because consumers, distribu-
tors, and even other producers of domestic iron pipe fittings all benefit from
continued production of a full line of fittings, McWane's full support program
was far from an unreasonable form of competition. On the contrary, it was
output-enhancing and thus procompetitive.
In the end, the FTC's Mc Wane decision failed to require adequate evidence in
support of the articulated theory of anticompetitive harm, ignored actual market
evidence suggesting an absence of such harm, and gave short shrift to an import-
ant procompetitive benefit of McWane's exclusive dealing. The Commission's
apparent and unjustified hostility toward vertical interbrand restraints like those
that McWane implemented is likely to discourage their use-despite their
general efficiency-and thereby enhance Type I error costs.
c. Graco
In April 2013, the FTC settled a challenge to a company's acquisitions of two
key rivals.l1 7 The defendant was Graco, the leading manufacturer of "fast set
equipment" (FSE) used by contractors to apply polyurethane foams and coat-
ings. In 2005 and 2008, Graco purchased its two closest competitors, eliminat-
ing almost all competition in the North American market for FSE.SS
Following the acquisition, the combined company allegedly coerced and threa-
tened FSE distributors so that they would not carry competitors' products.1 9
It also filed a questionable lawsuit against a rival, Gama/PMC, causing FSE
technologically similar obscure parts. McWane had an interest in preserving its buyers'
goodwill. In addition, a cross-subsidization strategy may have provided greater certainty than
separate pricing and thereby reduced McWane's costs. When deciding whether to incur the
fixed costs necessary to produce an obscure part, a business planner does not know how many
of those units it will eventually sell and thus how to price the units to ensure coverage of fixed
costs. If it sets the price too low, it will not recoup its fixed costs; if it prices too high, it will
encourage substitution away from the unit. Production of the part will involve less business
risk if the producer can recoup its costs in a manner that is more predictable-that is, by
collecting a small increment on parts whose demand is more predictable. If production risk is
lower, production is more likely to occur. Thus, the sort of cross-subsidization via full-line
forcing that McWane implemented may encourage greater production.
187 See Press Release, FTC, Graco, Inc. Settles FTC Charges That Its Acquisitions Illegally
Harmed Competition in the U.S. Market for Fast Set Equipment (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.
ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/04/graco-inc-settles-ftc-charges-its-acquisitions-illegally-
harmed. Each acquisition failed to meet the threshold requirement for reporting under governing
premerger notification requirements. Id.
188 See Complaint, In re Graco, Inc., F.T.C Docket No. C-4399, at ¶¶ 17-18, 27-30 (Apr. 17,
2013), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/04/130418gracocmpt.pdf).
189 Id.¶9.
The Roberts Court Versus the Enforcement Agencies 831
distributors to grow leery of that supplier and drop its products. 190 Those post-
acquisition actions helped cement Graco's market power by denying its actual
and potential rivals access to the distribution networks they needed to effect-
ively market their products.
In light of Graco's post-acquisition conduct, the FTC's consent order sens-
ibly prohibited Graco from threatening, coercing, or retaliating against distri-
butors that carry its rivals' products.1 91 It also required settlement of the
lawsuit that was impairing Gama/PMC's access to distributors, and it forbade
Graco from bringing a similar suit in the future. 19 2 But the order then went
further. It prohibited Graco from entering into exclusive dealing contracts with
distributors, and it placed limits on Graco's freedom to give loyalty discounts
to distributors. 193
There was, however, no evidence that those last forbidden activities-exclu-
sive dealing arrangements and loyalty discounts-contributed to the absence
of competition in the FSE market. Because exclusive dealing arrangements
and loyalty discounts are usually procompetitive,194 prohibiting their use by
Graco in the absence of evidence that they were responsible for the lack of
competition in the market, or were likely to be used to effect future anticompe-
titive harm, was more likely to hurt than help consumers.
As the Commission acknowledged, the market for FSE is precisely the sort
market in which exclusive dealing arrangements achieve the procompetitive
benefit of avoiding "interbrand free-riding." 196 Manufacturers of FSE will
enhance total sales if they train distributors on the proper use and various com-
plicated features of FSE. Consumers benefit from (and sales are increased by)
such training, because the distributors pass along their learning to end-user
purchasers. But if one FSE manufacturer trains a distributor on how to use the
190 Id. ¶ 10.
191 See Decision and Order, In re Graco, Inc., F.T.C Dkt. No. C-4399, at 5 III.A.5, 7 (Apr. 17,
2013); id. at 8, 5 III.B. Because the acquired companies had been fully integrated into the
acquirer, and all distinct operations had been shut down, it was impossible for the Commission
to "unscramble the eggs" by imposing a structural remedy that separates the companies or parts
thereof. The Commission therefore opted for a behavioral remedy that is, a list of restrictions
on how the combined company could operate its business in the future. The purported goal of
the behavioral remedy was to enhance consumer welfare by restoring competition that was
destroyed by the anticompetitive acquisitions.
192 Id. 5 II, at 5-6.
193 Id. 5 III.A.1, 2, 3, 4 & 6, at 6-7. Specifically, the order limited the purchase and inventory
levels upon which Graco may condition distributor discounts. Id. at 7, 5 III.A.6.c.
194 See supra notes 148-154 and accompanying text.
195 See Statement of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright, In re Graco, F.T.C File No. 101-0215,
at 3 (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/04/130418
gracowrightstatement.pdf).
196 See id. ("[T]he Commission's Complaint describes the fast-set equipment market as one
particularly well suited for exclusive arrangements. Specifically, the Complaint acknowledges
the sale of fast-set equipment demands specialized third party distributors that possess the
technical expertise to teach consumers how to use and maintain the manufacturer's
equipment.").
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equipment, other manufacturers whose product is carried by that distributor
will not need to do so themselves. The possibility that they will take a free-ride
at the expense of the manufacturer providing the training tends to dissuade all
manufacturers from providing such training, to the detriment of consumers.
Exclusive dealing or a loyalty discount that achieves near exclusivity may
prevent extensive free-riding and thereby assure a manufacturer that it will
receive the full benefit of its training efforts.1 9 7 By forbidding exclusive dealing
and loyalty discounts, then, the Commission's consent order threatened to
cause a consumer injury, and there was no reason to take such risk absent evi-
dence that exclusive dealing had been used, or was likely to be used in the
future, to create anticompetitive harm. 9S To avoid Type I error costs, the
consent order should have limited the behavioral remedy to actions that had
contributed to the anticompetitive situation at hand; it should not have
banned behaviors that had played no such role and were likely to benefit
consumers.
C. Intellectual Property Rights and Technology Standards
In recent years, the antitrust enforcement agencies have sought to use antitrust
(including unfair competition law) 19 9 to constrain the exercise of certain intel-
lectual property rights that have been incorporated into technological stan-
dards. This trend departs from prior policy, in place since 1995, pursuant to
which the agencies treated intellectual property the same as conventional
forms of property. 20 The agencies' purported goal in invoking antitrust in this
context is to police anticompetitive "hold-up" by holders of patents that must
197 Id. ("One could therefore easily imagine that manufacturers might only be willing to provide
training to distributors if they have some assurance that current or future competitors will be
unable to free ride on their investments in the distributors' technical expertise. Exclusive
dealing arrangements with distributors are one well-known and common method of
preventing such free riding.").
19R It is important to note that excluding exclusive dealing and loyalty discounts from the list of
behaviors prohibited by the consent order would not have given Graco free rein to use those
practices in a manner causing anticompetitive foreclosure. The Commission or a competitor
could always challenge a future exclusive dealing arrangement or loyalty discount if there were
evidence that the practice had caused anticompetitive harm. The remainder of the
Commission's behavioral remedy assured that there would be a viable competitor-Gama/
PMC-that would be in a position to challenge any such conduct, and, in light of the consent
order, the Commission and any reviewing court would take any future complaints quite
seriously.
199 Some of the agency conduct discussed here was taken pursuant to section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 5 45(a), which enables the FTC to police "unfair methods
of competition" even when they would not constitute standalone violations of the Sherman
Act. See infra note 99. Within this subpart, we refer to section 5 actions as antitrust actions.
200 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES
FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5 2.1 (1995) ("Agencies apply the same
general antitrust principles to conduct involving intellectual property that they apply to
conduct involving any other form of tangible or intangible property... .").
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be licensed by manufacturers of products employing standardized technolo-
gies. Other bodies of law, though, are capable of preventing anticompetitive
hold-up and are less likely to deter valid exercises of intellectual property
rights. Because the agencies' aggressive use of antitrust in this context provides
little marginal deterrence of anticompetitive conduct while threatening to
deter efficient exercises of intellectual property rights, it is likely to increase
Type I error costs without reducing Type II error costs, thereby raising error
costs overall.
To understand the agencies' position, some familiarity with the alphabet
soup of SSOs, SEPs, and FRAND commitments is in order. A great many
products-mobile telephones and DVD players, for example-are worth more
to consumers if they can operate with products made by competing manufac-
turers. In light of the great consumer value created by common technological
standards that permit interoperability among competing brands, "standard-
setting organizations" (SSOs) have emerged to determine which technologies
will be incorporated into particular standards (for example, those standards
that will comprise the 4G protocol for mobile telephony) .20 1 Because most
technology standards include multiple patented aspects, implementation of a
particular technological standard is likely to require the licensing of numerous
"standard-essential" patents (SEPs).
That creates potential for mischief. If a SEP holder can get its technology
implemented and widely adopted, it may then be in a good position to
demand higher royalties from implementers that would otherwise face great
switching costs. 202 To mitigate such hold-up problems, SSOs usually procure
agreements in which SEP holders commit up front to issue licenses on
"reasonable and non-discriminatory" (RAND) or "fair, reasonable, and
non-discriminatory" (FRAND) terms.203 A producer implementing some
SSO-established standard can be assured that SEP holders will not unreason-
ably increase their royalty demands once the producer has become "locked in"
to the technological standard.
201 For an overview of the role of standard setting, see ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS
COMPETITION COMMITTEE, WORKING PARTY No. 2 ON COMPETITION AND REGULATION,
DAF/COMP/WP2/WD(2010)28, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/us-
submissions-oecd-and-other-intemational-competition-fora/usstandardsetting.pdf.
202 See, e.g., Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEx. L. REV.
1991, 1992-93 (2007); Joseph Farrell, John Hayes, Carl Shapiro & Theresa Sullivan, Standard
Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603 (2007); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
& U.S. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 35-36 (2007) [hereinafter
2007 DOJ-FTC Report].
203 2007 FTC-DOJ Report, supra note 201, at 46-47. The RAND and FRAND terms are
essentially equivalent; FRAND is more frequently used in Europe and RAND is more
frequently used in the United States. See F/RAND, IT Law Wiki, http://itlaw.wikia.com/wiki/
F/RAND (last visited March 12, 2015).
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So what happens if a SEP holder files or threatens a lawsuit seeking in-
junctive relief or an exclusion order against an infringing adopter of the stand-
ard? The enforcement agencies have taken the position that enforcing one's
intellectual property rights in such fashion may constitute an antitrust viola-
tion. In an action against appliance manufacturer Bosch, for example, the
FTC claimed that a SEP holder's pursuit of injunctive relief amounted to an
unfair method of competition. 204 Then, in an ultimately settled action against
Motorola and its acquirer, Google, the Commission asserted that Motorola
"breached its FRAND obligations by seeking to enjoin and exclude implemen-
ters of its SEPs;" that parent company Google "used ... threats of exclusion
orders and injunctions to enhance its bargaining leverage against willing licen-
sees;" and that "Motorola filed, and Google prosecuted, patent infringement
claims before the United States International Trade Commission." 205 As
Commissioner Wright and Judge Douglas Ginsburg have observed, "These
complaints and consent orders, taken together, logically and necessarily
depend upon the presumption that protecting a valid SEP against infringement
by obtaining injunctive relief is itself anticompetitive." 206
The FTC also seems to have taken the position that it is anticompetitive for
a SEP holder to seek renegotiation of the royalties paid to it by a producer
utilizing the standard. Consider, for example, the Commission's complaint in
In re Negotiated Data Solutions, LLC. 207 The predecessor of defendant N-Data
was the assignee of patents that had been incorporated into the technological
standard for Fast Ethernet. Before the standard was established, the then-
holder of the patents agreed that if its patents were incorporated into the stand-
ard, they would be licensed for a low fee. 2 0 8 After the patents were assigned,
though, the assignee began to struggle financially and sought to renegotiate
its license fees. 209 Specifically, it demanded licensees pay reasonable and
204 Complaint, In re Robert Bosch GmbH, ¶ 20, Dkt. No. C-4377, 2012 WL 5944820 (Nov. 21,
2012).
205 Complaint, In re Motorola Mobility LLC, ¶¶ 25-26, Dkt. No. C-4410, 2013 WL 3944149
(July 23, 2013).
206 Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Whither Symmetry? Antitrust Analysis of Intellectual
Property Rights at the FTC and DO], 9 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 41 (2013). DOJ similarly
appears to have adopted the view that pursuit of an injunction or exclusion order by the holder
of a FRAND-encumbered SEP constitutes anticompetitive conduct. See id. at 14-15; UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, POLICY
STATEMENT ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY F/
RAND COMMITMENTS 6 (2013) (endorsing the view that an exclusion order based on a SEP
generally should not be granted because " [a] decision maker could conclude that the holder of
a F/RAND encumbered SEP had attempted to use an exclusion order to pressure an
implementer of a standard to accept more onerous licensing terms than the patent holder
would be entitled to receive consistent with the F/RAND commitment").
207 Complaint, In re Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, No. C-4234 (Sept. 22, 2008), http://www.
ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/09/080923ndscomplaint.pdf.
208 Id. ¶f 13-14.
209 Id. ¶¶25-29.
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non-discriminatory royalties, rather than the low fee the original patent holder
had agreed to.210 Based on that conduct, the FTC brought (and settled) an
unfair methods of competition suit against the assignee, citing hold-up con-
cerns. 2 11 Given that neither the original patent holder nor the assignee ever
engaged in any deception or other improper behavior in an effort to have
the patents incorporated into the relevant technological standard, 2 12 the
Commission's position seems to be that a mere effort to renegotiate the terms
for licensing a SEP constitutes anticompetitive conduct.
Whereas the enforcement agencies have sought to use antitrust to police in-
junctive actions and attempted license renegotiations by SEP holders, other
bodies of law appear capable of preventing anticompetitive hold-up. Consider
first an action for injunctive relief. Patent law would require the SEP holder to
establish that: (1) it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) remedies available at
law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury;
(3) the balance of hardships between itself and the infringer warrant an equit-
able remedy (for example, an injunction); and (4) the public interest would
not be disserved by a permanent injunction. 213 Succeeding under this test
would be quite difficult for a SEP holder that was just seeking to gain bargain-
ing leverage so as to enhance its royalties. 214 The SEP holder's agreement to
license on FRAND terms would be evidence that the first and second factors
are not met because any injury is reparable and monetary damages would be
adequate. Even if such evidence were rebutted, the fourth factor-public inter-
est-would call for judges to deny injunctions sought as part of a hold-up strat-
egy aimed at extracting extra surplus. Accordingly, as Justice Kennedy
explained, the basic patent law standards governing the granting of injunctive
relief can effectively prevent hold-up injunctions:
When the patented invention is but a small component of the product the companies seek
to produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in negotia-
tions, legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an in-
junction may not serve the public interest.2 15
When it comes to the second scenario of concern (that is, that a SEP holder
seeks to renegotiate the royalties paid to it by a producer utilizing the stand-
ard), basic contract law would appear to prevent hold-up harm. Although an
210 Id. ¶f 27-28.
211 See id. ¶ 32 (asserting hold-up theory); Decision and Order, In re Negotiated Date Solutions
LLC, Dkt. No. C-4234 (Sept. 22, 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
cases/2008/09/080923ndsdo.pdf.
212 Compare Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 463-57 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
213 See eBay v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
214 See generally Douglas H. Ginsburg, Taylor M. Owings & Joshua D. Wright, Enjoining
Injunctions: The Case Against Antitrust Liability for Standard Essential Patent Holders Who Seek
Injunctions, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2014, at 2-5.
215 eBay, 547 U.S. at 396-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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initial licensing commitment (for example, an agreement to license on
FRAND terms) runs between the SEP holder and the relevant SSO, any licen-
see implementing the standard at issue is an intended third-party beneficiary
of the commitment and should be able to enforce it. The legal question, then,
would be whether there is a basis in contract law for permitting renegotiation
of terms. A well-developed body of doctrine, exemplified by sections 89, 175,
and 176 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and section 2-209 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, governs this issue. 216 In general, the doctrine
permits renegotiation only if there is a good faith basis for changing the terms
at issue (for example, a market shift).2 17 Contract law is thus capable of pre-
cluding SEP holders from renegotiating royalties on FRAND-encumbered
patents as part of a hold-up strategy aimed at extracting extra surplus.218
In light of the degree to which basic patent and contract doctrines can
eliminate hold-up by holders of FRAND-encumbered SEPs, what role should
antitrust law play in policing injunctive actions and attempted royalty renego-
tiations by such patent holders? If one takes seriously the limits of antitrust, it
should play only a very small role.
Successful antitrust actions result in treble damages. 2 19 One justification for
that rule is that, because many antitrust violations occur in secret and are thus
not successfully prosecuted, to get optimal deterrence, the punishment for an
antitrust violator must be multiplied by the inverse of the likelihood of detec-
tion and successful prosecution (thus, if there is a one-in-three chance of suc-
cessful prosecution, damages should be multiplied by three to make the
expected value of a violation equal zero) .220 For antitrust violations that do not
occur in secret, however, treble damages are not needed for optimal deterrence
and will tend to overdeter. 221 A SEP holder's lawsuit for injunctive relief or
attempted renegotiation of royalties on a FRAND-encumbered patent is open
and notorious conduct. Antitrust's mandatory trebling of damages is thus
likely to overdeter here-an unfortunate result that is wholly unnecessary given
216 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 5 89 (1981) ("Modification of Executory
Contract"), 175 ("When Duress by Threat Makes a Contract Voidable"), 176 ("When a
Threat Is Improper"); Uniform Commercial Code 5 2-209 (2012) ("Modification, Rescission
and Waiver").
217 See, e.g., U.C.C. 5 2-209, cmt. 2 (2012) (observing that "such matters as a market shift which
makes performance come to involve a loss may provide such a reason [for modification of an
executory contract] even though there is no such unforeseen difficulty as would make out a
legal excuse from performance..."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 5 89, cmt. b
(1981) (provision is intended to permit modifications that are "fair and equitable").
218 See generally Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joshua D. Wright, The Limits of Antitrust and Patent
Holdup: A Reply to Cary et al., 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 505, 523 (2012)("[C]ontract law is both
better suited to the identification and regulation associated with patent holdup than is antitrust
and more likely to reduce transaction costs and welfare losses.").
219 15 U.S.C. 5 15 (providing for treble damages in private antitrust actions).
220 See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 114.
221 See id. at 721.
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that other bodies of law (patent and contract) are capable of preventing
hold-up problems. 222
One may retort that there is no need to worry about overdeterrence in this
context because the optimal level of injunctions and royalty renegotiations by
holders of FRAND-encumbered SEPs is zero. 223 That is incorrect. Both sorts
of conduct may constitute legitimate means of protecting property rights and
may thus be procompetitive. For example, a holder of a FRAND-encumbered
SEP might legitimately seek injunctive relief to enforce its patent if the infrin-
ger were judgment-proof or had rejected (or expressed an intention to reject) a
FRAND royalty.2 24 Alternatively, the SEP holder might legitimately try to re-
negotiate its royalties in light of some market shift that undermines the original
royalty rate. 225 In light of these procompetitive reasons for holders of
FRAND-encumbered SEPs to seek injunctive relief or royalty renegotiation,
the enforcement agencies' insistence on invoking antitrust (with its treble
damages) to police such efforts is likely to produce significant overdeterrence
and thus Type I error costs.226 And those error costs are unlikely to be offset
by a reduction in Type II (underdeterrence) error costs, because patent and
contract rules are fully capable of preventing instances of anticompetitive
hold-up.
As FTC actions have inappropriately raised antitrust risks faced by holders
of FRAND-encumbered SEPs, the DOJ has acted unwisely to limit the ability
of FRAND-encumbered SEP owners to obtain reasonable returns to their
patent rights. In a February 2, 2015 business review letter,227 DOJ informed a
prominent technical standards body, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (IEEE), that it had no plans to bring an antitrust enforcement
action against that SSO's proposed patent policy changes, which were then
222 See Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 217, at 508-11.
223 See, e.g., George S. Cary, Mark W. Nelson, Steven J. Kaiser & Alex R. Sistla, The Case for
Antitrust Law to Police the Patent Holdup Problem in Standard Setting, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 913,
932 (2011) (asserting that it is "unclear what would constitute a false positive in the context of
SSO-patent holdup" and describing conduct reachable as patent holdup by the antitrust laws
as "unlikely to be defended as efficient").
224 See Ginsburg, Owings & Wright, supra note 213, at 5 (" [A] SEP holder may require
injunctive relief against [a] SEP holder that is or appears or claims to be judgment proof or
consistently and in bad faith rejected FRAND terms to gain leverage in negotiations by putting
the SEP holder to the need for costly litigation.").
225 See Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 217, at 523-24.
226 This is true even if the antitrust action is brought under section 5 of the FTC Act, which
cannot be privately enforced by plaintiffs seeking treble damages. A successful Section 5 action
may give rise to copycat private actions under sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act or under
privately enforceable state antitrust laws (including so-called "little FTC Act" statutes, many
of which may be enforced in private actions). See Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 217, at 509
n.15.
227 Letter from Renata B. Hesse, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Department of Justice, to
Michael A. Lindsey, Esq., Dorsey & Whitney LLP (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/busreview/311470.htm. [hereinafter 2015 DOJ Letter].
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officially adopted on February 8 .228 These changes, unlike other standard
setting policies that were the subjects of favorable DOJ business review
letters, 229 greatly devalue SEPs and thereby undermine incentives to make
patents available for use in IEEE standards. 230
The new IEEE policy makes a number of significant policy changes. First,
any patentee seeking to have its patent(s) included in an IEEE standard must
provide the IEEE with a letter of assurance waiving its right to seek an injunction
against an infringer. The new policy also specifies that an analysis of comparable
licenses for purposes of determining a FRAND royalty can only consider
licenses for which the SEP holder has relinquished the right to seek and enforce
an injunction against an unlicensed implementer. Moreover, the policy provides
that a SEP holder may seek an injunction only after having fully litigated its
claims against an unlicensed implementer (even an infringer that steadily refuses
to negotiate a license) through the first level appeals stage-a process which
would essentially render injunctive relief highly impractical if not futile. 231 In
228 Press Release, IEEE Statement Regarding Updating of Its Standards-Related Patent Policy
(Feb. 8, 2015), https://www.ieee.org/about/news/2015/8_february_2015.html.
229 In a 2006 letter to the VMEbus International Trade Association ("VITA"), the DOJ
concluded that a policy under which VITA members would be required to disclose their most
restrictive licensing terms would preserve ex ante competition among alternative technologies.
See Letter from Thomas 0. Barnett, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Department of Justice, to
Robert A. Skitol, Esq. (Oct. 30, 2006), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/219380.
pdf. In a 2007 letter to IEEE, DOJ similarly had no objection to a proposed IEEE policy that
would allow patentees to make voluntary assurances about their intended maximum royalty
rates and most restrictive licensing terms. DOJ found that that those policies would stimulate
competition for inclusion in the standard and speed up the development, implementation, and
adoption of IEEE standards. See Letter from Thomas 0. Barnett, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S.
Department of Justice, to Michael A. Lindsay, Esq., Dorsey & Whitney LLP (Apr. 30, 2007),
http://www.atmet.gov/subdocs/222978.pdf. In sum, the VITA and 2007 IEEE proposals
enabled individual SSO participants to reveal and commit to certain individual licensing terms
that they had individually selected, thereby reducing the scope of negotiating uncertainty and
facilitating mutually-beneficial bargains free from regulatory dictates. In marked contrast, the
new 2015 IEEE policy substantially interferes in the scope for negotiating over key bargaining
terms affecting compensation, thereby drastically constraining contractual freedom.
230 For a critical evaluation of the 2015 DOJ business review letter, see, e.g., Stuart M. Chemtob,
Carte Blanche for SSOs? The Antitrust Division's Business Review Letter on the IEEE's Patent Policy
Update, 3 CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE, Mar. 2015, at 1, 1-10. For a critique of the new IEEE
patent policy, see Alden F. Abbott, Patent Policy Change Would Undermine Property Rights and
Innovation, HERITAGE FOUNDATION LEGAL MEMORANDUM, no. 147, Mar. 4, 2015, http://www.
heritage.org/research/reports/2015/03/patent-policy-change-would-undermine-property-
rights-and-innovation.
231 In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Supreme Court held that a patentee's request for an
injunction should be evaluated under the four-factor equitable standard traditionally used to
determine if an injunction should issue. See 547 U.S. 388 (2006). Although this holding
makes it difficult for the holder of a SEP to obtain an injunction, it does not eliminate
injunctive relief. U.S. courts have never held that an injunction may never be obtained by a
SEP holder, for example, where the infringer has refused the SEP holder's FRAND licensing
offer. See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("To the extent
that the district court applied a per se rule that injunctions are unavailable for SEPs, it erred.").
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addition, the new policy precludes a SEP holder from conditioning a license on
reasonable reciprocal access to non-SEP patents held by the counterparty licen-
see. 232 Furthermore, key factors to be consulted in determining a "reasonable"
royalty rate for a SEP include the SEP's contribution to the value of the smal-
lest saleable unit that practices the SEP, the value contributed to that unit in
light of all of the SEPs practiced by the unit, and the terms of only those existing
licenses covering use of the SEP that were not obtained under the threat of in-
junctive remedies. These factors straitjacket licensor-licensee negotiations. They
"all weigh in the direction of lowering royalty rates; other ... factors that might
weigh in the other direction are noticeably absent from the list." 233 The benefit
that a claimed invention provides to an end product may in certain circum-
stances be a better measure of SEP value added than the benefit conferred upon
the smallest saleable unit (for example, a small microchip) .234 A blinkered focus
Thus, by effectively preventing a SEP holder from obtaining viable injunctive relief, the new
IEEE policy undermines a valuable right that continues to be recognized by the judiciary. The
new IEEE policy also effectively precludes SEP holders from filing a petition with the U.S.
International Trade Commission (ITC) for exclusion of infringing goods pursuant to section
337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 5 1337), despite the fact that the ITC has never
indicated that it will not issue exclusion orders based on the infringement of SEPs.
Remarkably, this bar to exclusion order relief also is inconsistent with publicly proclaimed
DOJ and U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) policy (a fact not noted in the 2015
business review letter). In a 2013 joint statement, the DOJ and the PTO opined that the ITC
might properly issue an exclusion order benefiting a F/RAND-encumbered patent, where, for
example, an implementer refuses to pay what has been determined to be a FRAND royalty or
refuses to engage in negotiations to determine FRAND terms. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE AND U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, POLICY STATEMENT ON REMEDIES FOR
STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY F/RAND COMMITMENTS (2013),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/290994.pdf.
232 This arbitrary condemnation of reciprocity in licensing undermines the ability of SEP holders to
obtain value through mutually beneficial contracts. Moreover, since it eschews the evaluation of
case-specific competitive effects, it is at odds with the well-established views of U.S. antitrust
enforcers that cross-licensing may engender substantial efficiencies (for example, it can facilitate
integration of the licensed property with complementary factors of production, benefiting
consumers through the reduction of costs and the introduction of new products) and should be
evaluated under the antitrust rule of reason, which takes into account potential efficiencies and
anticompetitive effects. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5 2.3, 3.4 (1995),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm.
233 Chemtob, supra note 230, at 4.
234 Use of the smallest infringing component's price as the royalty base may undercompensate a
SEP holder for the SEP's contributions to complementary components. See J. Gregory Sidak,
The Property Royalty Base for Patent Damages, 10 J. COMPETITION L. & EcoN. 989, 993-95
(2014). In Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2009),
the Federal Circuit stated that "sophisticated parties routinely enter into license agreements
that base the value of the patented inventions as a percentage of the commercial products' sales
price." Thus, in calculating a reasonable royalty, "[t]here is nothing inherently wrong with
using the market value of the entire product, especially when there is no established market
value for the infringing component or feature." Id. at 1339.
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on one SEP as a proportion of all SEPs within a unit ignores the fact that certain
SEPs may be far more valuable than others 235 -a reality that would be revealed in
arms' length negotiations not limited by an artificial "proportionality" rule. Finally,
a refusal to weigh prior licensing terms agreed to under the threat of a possible in-
junction potentially removes from consideration large numbers of licensing agree-
ments that incorporated recognition of the patentee's core right to exclude. 236
All told, these new patent policy provisions encourage potential licensees to
insist on anticompetitive terms that monopsonistically reduce returns to SEP
holders below the competitive level-terms that, if agreed to jointly by the licensees,
could well be deemed a per se illegal monopsony-buyer cartel (with the potential
licensees buying license rights) .237 A failure to prosecute agreements of this sort,
which is encouraged by the business review letter, harmfully raises Type II error.238
In the end, then, the agencies' recent treatment of intellectual property
rights, particularly those incorporated into technological standards, is incon-
sistent with a limits of antitrust approach. Using antitrust to police hold-up
stemming from injunctive actions or renegotiation efforts by SEP holders pro-
vides little marginal benefit (given that patent law and contract law already
police bad behavior here), while imposing significant marginal cost (given the
235 Within an industry sector, the distribution of patent values is highly skewed, with some patents
being extremely valuable, and many others having little value. See, e.g., Mark Schankerman,
How Valuable Is Patent Protection? Estimates by Technology Field, 29 RAND J. EcoN. 77 (1998);
Gerald Silverberg & Bart Verspagen, The Size Distribution of Innovations Revisited: An
Application of Extreme Value Statistics to Citation and Value Measures of Patent Significance, 139 J.
ECONOMETRICS 318 (2007). Moreover, even though "most SEPs are likely entitled to only a
relatively low royalty ... for a given standard there likely are a small number of SEPs that are
entitled to a relatively large royalty. Some patented inventions provide important benefits and
have no close substitutes. Qualcomm's CDMA patents are an example." Gregory K. Leonard
& Mario A. Lopez, Determining RAND Royalty Rates for Standard-Essential Patents, 29
ANTITRUST 86 (2014), http://www.edgewortheconomics.com/files/documents/Determining
RANDRoyaltyRates-forStandard-EssentialPatents.pdf.
236 The courts have not categorically eliminated the injunction as a possible remedy for a SEP
holder, nor has the U.S. International Trade Commission sought to block SEP holders from
petitioning it for exclusion orders applicable to infringing imports. See supra note 230.
237 See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948) (price
fixing by purchasers per se illegal). See, e.g., Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 201 (2d Cir.
2001) ("a horizontal conspiracy among buyers to stifle competition is as unlawful as one
among sellers"). The 2015 DOJ Letter states that the potential competitive benefits of the new
policy likely outweigh any potential competitive harms, but it provides no support for this
assertion. Moreover, it evinces no awareness of how the new policy inherently tends to reduce
patent licensing fees below the competitive level by constraining the overall scope of
negotiations. While the Letter notes that the new policy does not prevent patentees from suing
for patent damages in the form of RAND (essentially equivalent to FRAND) compensation, it
ignores the fact that taking injunctions off the table (among other restrictions) depresses
returns to patentees, and that such depressed returns may well influence the analysis of courts
in calculating RAND.
238 It is most ironic and unfortunate that the FTC's recent actions implicitly encourage
inappropriate antitrust challenges to SEP holders, thus raising Type I error, whereas DOJ's
recent business review letter discourages appropriate antitrust challenges to anticompetitive
behavior, thus raising Type II error.
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likely overdeterrence resulting from potential antitrust liability). Respect for
the limits of antitrust would call for the enforcement agencies to stay their
hand. At the same time, using antitrust policy to encourage private bodies to
take actions that devalue SEPs thwarts well-founded challenges to anticompe-
titive monopsonistic behavior. Such a perverse antitrust policy threatens to
raise Type II error costs and is at odds with a limits of antitrust approach.
D. Merger Policy
The Limits of Antitrust-Easterbrook's article itself-said little about merger
review, focusing more on violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act
(for example, horizontal and vertical trade restraints, exclusionary practices).
But the article's prescription-minimize the sum of error and decision costs-
applies equally in the merger context. In at least three areas, the enforcement
agencies appear not to be following a limits of antitrust approach.
1. Reliance on the GUPPI
In 2010, the DOJ and FTC revised their Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which
detail how the agencies review proposed mergers to ensure that they will not
substantially lessen competition in some line of commerce. 239 The purported
goal of the revision was to reflect better the actual practices agencies follow in
conducting pre-merger investigations. 240 Perhaps the most notable new em-
phasis in the revised guidelines was a move away from market definition, the
traditional starting point for merger analysis, and toward consideration of poten-
tially adverse "unilateral" effects-that is, anticompetitive harms that, unlike
collusion or even non-collusive oligopolistic pricing, need not involve participa-
tion of any non-merging firms in the market. 24 1 The primary unilateral effect
emphasized by the new guidelines is that the merger may put "upward pricing
pressure" on brand-differentiated but otherwise similar products sold by the
merging firms. 242 The guidelines maintain that when upward pricing pressure
seems significant, it may be unnecessary to define the relevant market before
concluding that an anticompetitive effect is likely.243
239 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES (2010) [hereinafter 2010 Merger Guidelines]. Section 7 of the Clayton Act
prohibits a merger if "in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any
section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. 5 18.
240 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 239, at 1.
241 Id. at 20-24.
242 Id. at 20-22.
243 Id. at 7 ("The Agencies' analysis need not start with market definition. Some of the analytical
tools used by the Agencies to assess competitive effects do not rely on market definition."); id.
at 21 ("Where sufficient data are available, the Agencies may construct economic models
designed to quantify the unilateral price effects resulting from the merger. ... These merger
simulation models need not rely on market definition.").
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The logic of upward pricing pressure is straightforward. Suppose five firms
sell competing products (Products A through E) that, while largely substitutable,
are differentiated by brand. Given the brand differentiation, some of the pro-
ducts are closer substitutes than others. If the closest substitute to Product A is
Product B and vice-versa, then a merger between Producer A and Producer B
may result in higher prices even if the remaining producers (C, D, and E)
neither raise their prices nor reduce their output. The merged firm will know
that if it raises the price of Product A, most of the lost sales will be diverted to
Product B, which that firm also produces. Similarly, sales diverted from Product
B will largely flow to Product A. Thus, the merged company, seeking to maxi-
mize its profits, may face pressure to raise the prices of Products A and/or B.
Section 6 of the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines calls for upward pricing
pressure to be assessed without considering, at least initially, the degree to which
the merger may occasion efficiencies tending to reduce the merged firm's prices. 244
The guidelines thus contemplate the use of a "gross" upward pricing pressure
index (GUPPI).245 The GUPPI seeks to determine the likelihood, absent coun-
tervailing efficiencies, that the merged firm (for example, Producer A combined
with Producer B) would seek to enhance its profits by raising the price of one of its
competing products (for example, Product A), causing some of the lost sales on
that product to be diverted to its substitute (for example, Product B).246
In assessing unilateral effects, a GUPPI would be calculated for each com-
peting product sold by the merging firms (for example, there would be a
244 Id. at 20-22.
245 See Steven C. Salop, Serge Moresi & John R. Woodbury, Scoring Unilateral Effects with the
GUPPI: The Approach of the New Horizontal Merger Guidelines, CRA COMPETITION MEMO,
Aug. 31, 2010, at 2, http://www.crai.com/sites/default/files/publications/Commentary-on-the-
GUPPI_0.pdf.
246 The GUPPI on Product A would consist of:
The Value of Sales Diverted to Product B
Forgone Revenues on Lost Product A Sales.
The value of sales diverted to Product B, the numerator, is equal to the number of units
diverted from Product A to Product B times the profit margin (price minus marginal cost) on
Product B. The foregone revenues on lost Product A sales, the denominator, is equal to the
number of lost Product A sales times the price of Product A. Thus, the fraction set forth above
is equal to:
Number of Product A Sales Diverted to Product B x Unit Margin on B
Number of Product A Sales Lost x Price of Product A.
This, in turn, equals:
Number of Product A Sales Diverted to Product B
Number of Product A Sales Lost
Price of Product B - Marginal Cost of Product B
Price of Product A.
See generally id. at 2-4 (explaining how to measure GUPPI).
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separate GUPPI for Product A and for Product B). The Guidelines themselves
do not specify how high the GUPPI for a particular product must be before
competitive concerns are raised, but prominent proponents of the Guidelines'
approach have suggested that a GUPPI of less than 5 percent would suggest an
absence of adverse unilateral effects, whereas a GUPPI greater than 10 percent
should be taken to create a rebuttable presumption of adverse unilateral
effects. 247
Though the GUPPI is a potentially powerful tool for evaluating competitive
effects, its prominence in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines-especially
when coupled with the guidelines' deemphasis of market definition-threatens
to create significant error costs. As an initial matter, the simplistic-sounding
GUPPI turns out to be difficult to calculate in practice. Take the final formula
set forth in footnote 246. Calculating the fraction on the left-the so-called
"diversion ratio" 24 8-requires enforcers to determine both the "own-price"
and "cross-price" elasticities of demand for the products under consider-
ation. 249 Although economists often estimate demand curves (from which
they may derive elasticities of demand), doing so is not easy, and estimates are
fraught with error. 2 50
Enforcers are also likely to err in calculating the fraction on the right side of
the final formula in footnote 246 (that is, the profit margin on the product to
which sales are diverted, divided by the price of the product whose sales are
diminished). Calculating profit margins requires estimating marginal cost
(that is, the cost of producing one additional unit), which is notoriously diffi-
cult to measure. Standard accounting measures do not capture information on
marginal cost. Whereas average variable cost (AVC)-the sum of non-fixed
costs associated with producing the seller's total output, divided by the
number of units produced-is easier to calculate and often serves as a proxy
247 Id. at 2 ("... [A] GUPPI of less than 5% would be reasonably treated as evidence that 'the
value of diverted sales is proportionately small' and hence that the proposed merger is unlikely
to raise unilateral effects concerns. In contrast, it seems likely that a GUPPI of 10% or more
would suggest more significant competitive concerns."); Carl Shapiro, Update from the
Antitrust Division, Remarks as Prepared for the ABA Section of Antitrust Law Fall Forum 24
(Nov. 18, 2010) ("Current division practice is to treat the value of diverted sales as
proportionately small if it is no more than 5% of the lost revenues.").
248 The Diversion Ratio for Product A to Product B equals the number of Product A sales
diverted to Product B divided by the number of Product A sales lost. In other words, it is the
percentage of lost Product A sales that are recaptured by the merged firm in the form of
Product B sales.
249 "Own-price elasticity of demand" reflects the degree to which the quantity demanded of a
product drops as its price rises. That measure must be assessed to determine the denominator
of the Diversion Ratio (that is, the number of A sales lost). "Cross-price elasticity of demand"
reflects the degree to which an increase in the price of one product increases the quantity
demanded of a substitute product. That measure must be assessed to determine the
numerator of the Diversion Ratio (that is, number of ProductA sales diverted to Product B.
250 See Dennis W. Carlton, Revising the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 10 J. COMPETITION L. &
EcoN. 1, 25-26 (2010) (discussing "difficulties with measurement of diversion ratios").
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for marginal cost, using that measure here would be troubling. AVC tends to
be lower than marginal cost over the relevant range of output, so using AVC to
determine the profit margins on products to which sales are diverted (that is,
price minus AVC) will tend to overestimate profit margins and, accordingly,
exaggerate upward pricing pressure. 251 It seems, then, that reliance on the
GUPPI as an initial indication of potential anticompetitive effect will generate
significant errors.
This is especially true because the GUPPI excludes two key considerations
influencing the likelihood of adverse unilateral effects: efficiencies stemming
from the merger and product repositioning. 2 52 Any upward pricing pressure
resulting from the incentive of a merged firm to divert sales from one product
to a higher-margin substitute should be balanced against merger-induced cost-
savings that would put downward pricing pressure on one or more of the
merged company's products. Indeed, the original upward pricing pressure
model incorporated efficiencies as an integral part of the analysis, recognizing
that without an offset for efficiencies-a "standard deduction" of sorts-appli-
cation of the model would always indicate an adverse price effect. 25 3 The 2010
Guidelines, however, do not include an efficiencies credit in the initial calcula-
tion of upward pricing pressure. They instead relegate consideration of
merger-induced efficiencies to a later analytical step under the standard effi-
ciencies defense. 2 54 This is troubling, for, as explained below, the quantum of
proof required to establish an efficiencies defense is greater than that necessary
to create an inference of anticompetitive harm. 255 The 2010 guidelines also
call for GUPPI to be calculated without regard to other market participants'
efforts to "reposition" their own products (modify their characteristics) to
more closely compete with the products subject to GUPPI, thereby reducing
the profitability of price increases and moderating upward pricing pressure.
Effectively a form of new entry, product repositioning tends to constrain
GUPPI price increases.256 Like merger-induced efficiencies, however,
251 As Dennis Carlton has explained:
If one uses average variable cost as an approximation of marginal cost [in determining the
profit margin on the product to which sales are diverted], then one runs the risk of
overestimating margins (and market power), with the consequence that the UPP index
will overestimate the incentive to raise prices post-merger, because average variable cost is
often below marginal cost.
Id. at 16-17.
252 See James A. Keyte & Kenneth B. Schwartz, "Tally-Ho!": UPP and the 2010 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, 77 ANTITRUST L. J. 587, 629-30, 639-45, 648-49 (2011).
253 Id. at 590-91, 648-49.
254 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 238, at 29-32.
255 See infra notes 263-274 and accompanying text.
256 See Jerry Hausman, Serge Moresi & Mark Rainey, Unilateral Effects of Mergers with General
Linear Demand, 111 EcONoMICs LETTERS 119 (2011) (explaining how repositioning and
entry tend to reduce the magnitude of potential price increases post-merger).
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product repositioning is relegated to an afterthought under the 2010
Guidelines. 257
In light of the difficulty of measurement and the exclusion, at least at the
initial stage, of any consideration of merger-induced efficiencies or product
repositioning, it is particularly troubling that the GUPPI embraced by the
2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines has not been empirically verified. As
economist Dennis Carlton observed, "[T]he use of UPP as a merger screen is
untested; to my knowledge, there has been no empirical analysis that has been
performed to validate its predictive value in assessing the competitive effects of
mergers."258 This dearth of empirical evidence seems especially problematic
in light of the enforcement agencies' spotty track record in predicting the
effects of mergers. Economist Craig Peters, for example, found that the agen-
cies' merger simulations produced wildly inaccurate predictions about the
price effects of airline mergers.259 Professor Carlton thus warns:
UPP is effectively a simplified version of merger simulation. As such, Peters's findings tell a
cautionary tale-more such studies should be conducted before one treats UPP, or any
other potential merger review method, as a consistently reliable methodology by which to
identify anticompetitive mergers.260
Establishing upward pricing pressure using the GUPPI is easier than defining
a market, assessing market concentration, and analyzing other structural
factors that have traditionally been considered in horizontal merger review.
Accordingly, the 2010 Guidelines are likely to increase the number of merger
challenges launched by the agencies. Veteran antitrust enforcers Joseph Simons
and Malcolm Coate, for example, have noted that the 2010 Guidelines' upward
pricing pressure screen "identifies as potentially problematic far more mergers
than would be challenged or even investigated under the enforcement standards
that have existed for more than twenty years." 2 61 That might be appropriate if
there were a significant number of false negatives under the older approach. But
the agencies have presented no evidence that that is the case. As James Keyte
and Kenneth Schwartz have observed:
UPP would suggest condemning 7-to-6 mergers where margins would be considered moder-
ate. These are mergers that almost certainly would have avoided enforcement in the past. We
are unaware of any evidence from merger retrospectives or postmerger enforcement suggest-
ing that most or many of those mergers, in fact, led to anticompetitive price increases. 2 62
257 See 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 238, at 27-29.
258 Carlton, supra note 249, at 24.
259 Craig Peters, Evaluating the Performance of Merger Simulation: Evidence from the U.S. Airline
Industry, 49 J.L. & EcoN. 627 (2006).
260 Carlton, supra note 249, at 32.
261 Joseph J. Simons & Malcolm B. Coate, Upward Pressure on Price Analysis: Issues and Implications
for Merger Policy, 6 EUR. COMPETITION J. 377, 389 (2010).
262 Keyte & Schwartz, supra note 251, at 629.
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Keyte and Schwartz go on to observe that one of the most ridiculed merger
challenges in history-the notorious Von's Grocery case-would have been ap-
propriate under the 2010 Guidelines' approach:
... [The Guidelines'] UPP screen would have indicated upward pricing pressure [from the
merger of Los Angeles supermarket chains Von's and Shopping Bag] even though the
merged grocery store had less than a 10 percent market share. In other words, the UPP
screen as incorporated in the Guidelines would have provided a basis to condemn a merger
that clearly was not anticompetitive. In the real world, Vons' eventually became part of
Safeway the largest grocer in Los Angeles when Von's Grocery was decided-and the
grocery market in Los Angeles remains intensely competitive today. 26 3
At the end of the day, then, deemphasizing market definition and market con-
centration and instead premising merger challenges on upward pricing pres-
sure measured by an index whose accuracy is questionable will likely raise error
costs by increasing improper condemnations of procompetitive mergers.
2. Asymmetric Treatment of Efficiencies and Potential Anticompetitive Harms
By making it easier for the enforcement agencies to make their initial showing
that a horizontal merger is likely to occasion anticompetitive harm, the 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines exacerbate a problem that has long existed in
merger analysis: the quantum of proof required for the enforcement agencies
to establish a merger's likely anticompetitive harms is less than that the
merging parties themselves must produce to establish likely procompetitive
benefits (that is, merger-induced efficiencies). That asymmetry creates a sys-
tematic bias toward condemnation of horizontal mergers and will tend to
enhance error costs relative to an approach that evaluated potential anticompe-
titive harms and procompetitive benefits according to the same standards.
Horizontal mergers, like so many business activities, are competitive mixed
bags. Any particular merger of competitors may impose some consumer harm
by reducing the competition facing the merged firm. The same merger,
though, may provide some consumer benefit by lowering the merged firm's
costs and thereby allowing it to compete more vigorously-most notably, by
lowering its prices. A merger policy committed to minimizing the consumer
welfare losses from unwarranted condemnations of net beneficial mergers and
improper acquittals of net harmful ones would afford equal treatment to
claims of anticompetitive harm and procompetitive benefit, requiring each to
be established by the same quantum of proof.264
263 Id. at 630.
264 See Daniel A. Crane, Rethinking Merger Efficiencies, 110 MICH. L. REv. 347, 386-387 (2011).
("If the government and merging parties were held to the same standard of proof... then,
conceptually, harms and efficiencies would be given equal weight despite the different
allocations of burdens of proof... [T]he first-order preference should be to treat harms and
benefits symmetrically on an individualized basis and only make a systematic correction to the
extent necessary in light of the system's actual experience with a principle of symmetry.")
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That is not how things work under the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
As explained above, by deemphasizing market definition and permitting adverse
unilateral effects to be established using the GUPPI, the Guidelines make it
fairly easy for enforcement agencies to prove likely anticompetitive harms from a
merger of rivals. 265 By contrast, the merging parties must: (1) prove that any
claimed efficiencies are "merger-specific" (that is, incapable of being achieved
26626
absent the merger); (2) "substantiate" asserted efficiencies;2 67 and (3) show
that such efficiencies will result in the very markets in which the agencies have
established likely anticompetitive effects. 268
Those showings may be difficult to make. With respect to the first (merger-
specificity), merging parties must be prepared to rebut assertions that their
claimed efficiencies could have been achieved using all sorts of creative con-
tracting. Although the Merger Guidelines maintain that the agencies "do not
insist upon a less restrictive alternative that is merely theoretical," 269 it is
unclear which alternatives the agencies will deem impracticable. 270 With
respect to the verifiability requirement, the agencies insist that merging parties
prove "the likelihood and magnitude of each asserted efficiency, how and
when each would be achieved (and any costs of doing so), [and] how each
would enhance the merged firm's ability and incentive to compete... ."271
This is a much heavier proof burden than that facing the enforcers tasked with
establishing potential anticompetitive effects. The last required showing-that
the claimed efficiencies are likely to result in the same market experiencing
anticompetitive effects-will be particularly difficult when the claimed harm is
upward pricing pressure identified by the GUPPI. When the agencies assert
that a merger will put upward pricing pressure on a brand-differentiated
product (for example, Product A) because lost sales of that product are par-
ticularly likely to be diverted to a high-margin substitute also produced by the
merged firm (for example, Product B), they are implicitly arguing that there is
265 See supra notes 238-262 and accompanying text.
266 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 238, at 30 ("The Agencies credit only those efficiencies
likely to be accomplished with the proposed merger and unlikely to be accomplished in the
absence of either the proposed merger or another means having comparable anticompetitive
effects.").
267 Id. at 30 (" [I]t is incumbent upon the merging firms to substantiate efficiency claims .....
268 Id. at 30, n. 14 ("The Agencies normally assess competition in each relevant market assessed
by a merger independently and normally will challenge the merger if it is likely to be
anticompetitive in any relevant market.").
269 Id. at 30.
270 See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright in Memorandum Opinion &
Order, In re Ardagh Group S.A., and Saint-Gobain Containers, Inc., and Compagnie de
Saint-Gobain, F.T.C File No. 131-0087, at 5 (Apr. 11, 2014) [hereinafter Wright Ardagh
Dissent] ("While the Merger Guidelines assert that Agencies 'do not insist upon a less
restrictive alternative that is merely theoretical,' there is little systematic evidence as to how this
requirement is applied in practice.").
271 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 238, at 30.
848 Journal of Competition Law & Economics
a "market" consisting of these two brands.272 Merger-induced efficiencies not
involving those two brands would thus be "out of market" and might not be
credited. 27 3 Taken together, then, the merger-specificity, verifiability, and "in
market" requirements of the efficiencies defense place a much heavier proof
burden on those attempting to show merger-induced efficiencies than on the
enforcers seeking to establish likely anticompetitive harm. 274 This unbalanced
scale is likely to generate significant Type I error costs. 275
3. Embracing Conduct Remedies Versus Embracing Structural Remedies
in Merger Review
A third merger-related development that may be inconsistent with a limits of
antitrust approach is the enforcement agencies' increased reliance on conduct
remedies in merger cases. Traditionally, when an enforcement agency con-
cluded that a merger was likely to lessen competition, it imposed a "structural"
remedy-either an order that the merger not proceed or a command that the
parties divest some portion of the businesses to be merged.2 76 Enforcement of
such a remedy was a simple matter; enforcers merely had to ensure that the
parties did a single, discrete thing (that is, cancel their merger plans altogether
or first sell off some line of business). In recent years, though, the agencies have
272 See Carlton, supra note 249, at 20 (observing that when there is unilateral harm in the form of
upward pricing pressure, "the logic of market definition in the ... Guidelines would indicate
that the products of the two merging firms actually, by themselves, constitute a relevant
market").
273 For a general argument against the "in market" requirement for crediting efficiencies, see Jan
M. Rybnicek & Joshua D. Wright, Outside In or Inside Out?: Counting Merger Efficiencies Inside
and Out of the Relevant Market, in 2 WILLIAM E. KOVACIC: AN ANTITRUST TRIBUTE-LIBER
AMICORUM (2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2411270.
274 See Crane, supra note 263, at 348 (" [A]s a matter of both verbal formulation in the governing
legal norms and observed practice of antitrust enforcement agencies and courts, the
government is accorded greater evidentiary leniency in proving anticompetitive effects than the
merging parties are in proving offsetting efficiencies."); Malcolm B. Coate, Efficiencies in
Merger Analysis: An Institutionalist View, 13 Sup. CT. EcoN. REv. 230 (2005) (observing that
"the efficiency defense faces an impossibly high burden"); Wright Ardagh Dissent, supra note
269, at 4-7.
275 The 2010 Guidelines' asymmetric treatment of upward pricing pressure theories and asserted
merger-induced efficiencies is particularly troubling when the merger at issue involves
innovative firms with heavy research and development operations (e.g., pharmaceuticals, etc.).
Such firms are particularly likely both (1) to enjoy high profit margins (price must exceed
marginal cost because the fixed costs associated with R&D are huge), and (2) to experience
significant cost reductions from merging operations. The first factor suggests that the GUPPI
resulting from a merger oftwo such firms would be significant (so the government could easily
establish likely adverse unilateral effects), but the second factor suggests large efficiencies
could result from such a merger. If those efficiencies get a short shrift in the analysis, as is likely
under the Guidelines' approach, beneficial mergers in these industries are especially likely to
be condemned.
276 See William F. Shughart II & Diana W. Thomas, Antitrust Enforcement in the Obama
Administration's First Term: A Regulatory Approach, CATO INST. POL'Y ANALYSIS, Oct. 22,
2013, at 1, 2, http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa739_web.pdf.
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taken to approving mergers on the condition that the parties follow some set of
detailed conduct rules. 277 Unlike structural remedies, such conduct remedies
require the enforcement agencies to engage in continual monitoring of the
parties' behavior. They effectively transform antitrust enforcers into regulatory
agencies and invite all sorts of problems associated with ongoing government
regulation of business behavior.
The agencies' embrace of a regulatory approach to merger remedies is most
evident in DOJ's 2011 Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies (the
"2011 Remedies Guide"). 278 That document replaced DOJ's 2004 Remedies
Guide, which proclaimed that "[s]tructural remedies are preferred to conduct
remedies in merger cases because they are relatively clean and certain, and gen-
erally avoid costly government entanglement in the market." 279 The 2011
Remedies Guide removed that statement, as well as the assertion that behavioral
remedies would be appropriate only in limited circumstances. The 2011 Guide
instead remained neutral on the choice between structural and conduct remed-
ies, explaining that "[i]n certain factual circumstances, structural relief may be
the best choice to preserve competition. In a different set of circumstances,
behavioral relief may be the best choice."280 The 2011 Guide also removed the
older Guide's discussion of the limitations of conduct remedies. 281
Not surprisingly in light of the altered guidance, several of DOJ's recent
merger challenges-Ticketmaster/Live Nation, Comcast/NBC Universal, and
Google/ITA Software, for example-have resulted in settlements involving
detailed and significant regulation of the combined firm's conduct. 282 The
277 Id. at 14.
278 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES
(June 2011), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/272350.pdf.
279 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DivisioN POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES
5 III.A (October 2004), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/205108.htm.
280 2011 Remedies Guide, supra note 277, at 4.
281 The 2004 Guide had warned:
Conduct remedies suffer from at least four potentially substantial costs that a structural
remedy can in principle avoid. First, there are the direct costs associated with monitoring
the merged firm's activities and ensuring adherence to the decree. Second, there are the
indirect costs associated with efforts by the merged firm to evade the remedy's "spirit"
while not violating its letter. As one example, a requirement that the merged firm not raise
price may lead it profitably, and inefficiently, to reduce its costs by cutting back on quality
thereby effecting an anticompetitive increase in the "quality adjusted" price. Third, a
conduct remedy may restrain potentially procompetitive behavior. ... Fourth, even where
"effective," efforts to regulate a firm's future conduct may prevent it from responding
efficiently to changing market conditions. For all of these reasons, structural merger
remedies are strongly preferred to conduct remedies.
2004 Merger Remedies Guide, supra note 278, 5 III.A.
282 See Final Judgment, United States v. Ticketmaster Entm't, Inc. and Live Nation, Inc., No.
10-cv-00139 (July 30, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f260900/260909.htm; Final
Judgment, United States v. Comcast Corp., General Electric, and NBC Universal, Inc., No.
11-cv-00106 (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f274700/274713.pdf; Final
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settlements have involved mandatory licensing requirements, price regulation,
compulsory arbitration of pricing disputes with recipients of mandated
licenses, obligations to continue to develop and support certain products, the
establishment of informational firewalls between divisions of the merged com-
panies, prohibitions on price and service discrimination among customers,
and various reporting requirements.28 3 Settlements like these move antitrust a
long way from the state of affairs described by then-professor Stephen Breyer,
who wrote in his classic book Regulation and Its Reform:
[I]n principle the antitrust laws differ from classical regulation both in their aims and in
their methods. The antitrust laws seek to create or maintain the conditions of a competitive
marketplace rather than replicate the results of competition or correct for the defects of
competitive markets. In doing so, they act negatively, through a few highly general provi-
sions prohibiting certain forms ofprivate conduct. They do not affirmatively order firms to
behave in specified ways; for the most part, they tell private firms what not to do ... . Only
rarely do the antitrust enforcement agencies create the detailed web of affirmative legal obli-
gations that characterizes classical regulation. 28 4
At least in the merger arena, Breyer's observations are no longer accurate.
Judgment, United States v. Google, Inc. & ITA Software, Inc., No. 11-cv-00688 (October 5,
2011), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f275800/275897.pdf.
283 See generally Shughart & Thomas, supra note 275, at 14-17 (summarizing conduct remedies in
Ticketmaster/Live Nation, Comcast/NBC Universal, and Google/ITA Software mergers). In
the Comcast/NBC Universal merger, for example, the defendants were required to: (1)
provide all NBC's video programming to requesting programming distributors on terms that
were "economically equivalent" to those offered other distributors; (2) agree to have
"economic equivalence" determined via arbitration if they could not agree on terms with a
requesting distributor; (3) relinquish voting and veto rights over HULU (in which NBC
owned a 32 percent interest) and establish an informational firewall between their joint venture
and HULU; and (4) refrain from behavior considered to discriminate against Internet service
providers. Id. at 16. Google and ITA Software were required to: (1) honor existing contracts
for ITA's QPX software product (used by Internet travel sites that could compete with
Google), renew those licenses under similar terms, and offer licenses to online travel sites on
fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms; (2) continue to develop upgrades to QPX,
investing the same resources in research and development as ITA had; (3) license InstaSearch,
a QPX add-on that enabled customers to enter more flexible inquiries; (4) adhere to a strict
internal firewall that would prevent information on QPX licensees from being available to
Google for use in its own travel search operations; and (5) report complaints from online travel
search competitors who accused Google of acting unfairly in displaying flight search
advertising. Id. at 17. Ticketmaster and Live Nation were: (1) "prohibited from retaliating
against venue owners that enter into contracts with a competing ticketing agency;" (2) "barred
from conditioning the scheduling of live entertainment events in a particular venue on the use
of [their] own ticketing platform by the same venue;" (3) "prohibited from conditioning the
provision of ticketing services to a venue on their simultaneous delivery of live entertainment
events;" (4) required to create and maintain "a firewall blocking the disclosure of client
ticketing data to employees of other branches of the Ticketmaster/Live Nation business
entity;" and (5) required to "disclos[e] ... ticketing data to clients who chose to terminate their
contracts with the newly merged company." Id. at 15-16.
284 STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 156-57 (1982).
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How the move to regulatory merger remedies cuts from a limits of antitrust
perspective is somewhat unclear. On the one hand, if imposition of conduct
remedies liberates procompetitive mergers that otherwise would have been
barred outright, the trend toward greater use of such remedies may reduce
overall error costs. By offering enforcers a less restrictive regulatory option-
some middle ground between permitting the merger unconditionally and
banning it or ordering divestment-conduct remedies could facilitate mergers
that provide net benefits to consumers but raise concerns that cannot be
addressed through divestiture. It appears, however, that conduct remedies are
being used not to liberate otherwise banned mergers but to increase regulation
of mergers that otherwise would have been approved unconditionally. The
three mergers discussed above, for example, were all vertical mergers (that is,
mergers not of competitors but of firms that are in some sort of buyer-supplier
relationship). Recognizing that vertical mergers are generally procompetitive,
antitrust enforcers have in recent decades cut back on challenges to such
mergers. 285 It is likely that the greater availability of conduct remedies will
reverse this trend.
That is troubling, for conduct remedies present at least four difficulties
from a limits of antitrust perspective. First, they may thwart procompetitive
conduct by the regulated firm. When it comes to regulating how a firm inter-
acts with its customers and rivals, it is extremely difficult to craft rules that will
ban the bad without also precluding the good. For example, requiring a
merged firm to charge all customers the same price, a commonly imposed
conduct remedy, may make it hard for the firm to serve clients who impose
higher costs and may thwart price discrimination that actually enhances overall
market output. 286 Second, conduct remedies entail significant direct imple-
mentation costs. They divert enforcers' attention away from ferreting out antic-
ompetitive conduct elsewhere in the economy and require managers of
regulated firms to focus on appeasing regulators rather than on meeting their
285 See, e.g., Deborah L. Feinstein, Editor's Note: Are the Vertical Merger Guidelines Ripe for
Revision?, 24 ANTITRUST 5 (2010).
286 As the 2004 Remedies Guide explained,
[A] conduct remedy may restrain potentially procompetitive behavior. For instance, a
requirement that the merged firm not discriminate against its rivals in the provision of a
necessary input can raise difficult questions of whether cost-based differences justify
differential treatment and thus are not truly discriminatory. Firms often sell to a wide
range of customers, some of which have very intense demands for the product and would
be willing to pay a high price based on that demand and others of which are not willing to
pay nearly so much. When this is the case, and when price discrimination is feasible,
permitting the firm to charge low prices to customers that have a low demand for the
product and higher prices to customers that have a high demand for the product can
increase not only the firm's profits, but total output and consumer welfare as a whole.
Requiring the firm to charge a single price to all may, in such circumstances, result in a
price that excludes the low demand group entirely.
2004 Remedies Guide, supra note 278, 5 III.A.
852 Journal of Competition Law & Economics
customers' desires.28 7 Third, conduct remedies tend to grow stale. Because
competitive conditions are constantly changing, a conduct remedy that seems
sensible when initially crafted may soon turn out to preclude beneficial busi-
ness behavior. 288 Finally, by transforming antitrust enforcers into regulatory
agencies, conduct remedies invite wasteful lobbying and, ultimately, destruc-
tive agency capture. 289
In the end, these drawbacks likely outweigh any benefits from deterrence of
anticompetitive conduct. As William Shughart and Diana Thomas have
observed, "supervising compliance has been a backwater for the attorneys and
economists employed by the federal antitrust agencies," most of whom "do not
want to be involved with ensuring compliance with court orders-job assign-
ments that rarely make headlines." 290 Accordingly, detailed conduct remedies
often do not achieve their stated ends, while still imposing significant costs.
Their increased use seems inconsistent with a limits of antitrust approach.
V. CONCLUSION
Antitrust is an inherently limited enterprise. If it reaches either too far or not
far enough, consumers will suffer. If policy makers seek to minimize mistakes
by increasing the complexity of the liability rule, business planners and adjudi-
cators will face higher decision costs. Antitrust's inevitable-and inexorable-
error and decision costs collectively comprise its limits.
287 Shughart & Thomas, supra note 275, at 13 ("[T]o the extent that time and resources must be
devoted to compliance matters, the enforcement authorities and the courts are deflected from
their state mission of ferreting out and prohibiting possible antitrust law violations elsewhere in
the economy-and the owners and managers of private firms are diverted from their primary
goal of efficiently satisfying their customers' needs.").
288 Id. ("[B]ecause behavioral remedies are based on assumptions about competitive market
conditions at a point in time, they are static and fail to predict the ways in which competition
may evolve in the future, or may lock the affected firms into technological or behavioral
patterns that restrict their freedom to adapt to changing market conditions.").
289 As John Kwoka and Diana Moss have observed,
[T]he increased interaction between large private companies and government enforcers
necessitated by behavioral remedies could increase the risk that the antitrust agency is
"captured" by the economic interests of the merging parties. While U.S. antitrust
agencies have been commendably free of such influence, it should be recognized that for
the antitrust agencies, there is little glory in compliance, but for the merged company, the
incentives are quite different. Finding ways around the harsher aspects of a consent order
may be worth a great deal to the client, who can justify expending significant resources on
minimizing its impact on profits. Merging parties might therefore lobby in settlement
proceedings for certain types of behavioral remedies because they allow the merged firm
to more easily pursue profit-maximizing behavior.
John E. Kwoka & Diana L. Moss, Behavioral Merger Remedies: Evaluation and Implications for
Antitrust Enforcement, American Antitrust Institute 35 (2011), http://www.antitrustinstitute.
org/sites/default/files/AAI wp-behavioral%20remedies-final.pdf.
290 Shughart & Thomas, supra note 275, at 13-14.
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The Roberts Court and the federal enforcement agencies have taken strik-
ingly different stances on the limits of antitrust. The Roberts Court has gener-
ally respected them, crafting rules designed to minimize the sum of error and
decision costs and thereby maximize antitrust's social value in light of its inher-
ent limitations. The Agencies, by contrast, seem skeptical of the very existence
of antitrust's limits.
What is the reason for this divergence? An obvious explanation turns on the
institutional features of federal courts versus agencies. Generalist judges, who
regularly confront cases across the legal spectrum, are aware of the limits of
their expertise and, in light of their life-tenure and limited opportunities for ad-
vancement, have no obvious need to expand their turf. Agency staff, by con-
trast, are constantly reminded of-and rewarded for-their specialized
expertise, and they tend to gain both prestige and financial rewards as their au-
thority expands. Their natural tendency is to expand the law's reach.
Regardless of the cause of the diverging stances on the limits of antitrust,
two things are clear. First, recent enforcement agency policies are in severe
tension with the philosophy that informs Supreme Court antitrust jurispru-
dence. Second, if the agencies do not reverse course, acknowledge antitrust's
limits, and seek to optimize the law in light of those limits, consumers will
suffer.

